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ABSTRACT
The current geopolitical climate is one which has seen a renewed state of tensions in the
relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation dating to 2014 and Russia’s
annexation of Ukrainian territory. This current state of geopolitical tensions has led many to
question: are we in a state of New Cold War today? If so, today’s Cold War may be defined by
the advancement of cyber capabilities and the use of propaganda and misinformation. How will
this be the defining factor in the New Cold War? Through a comprehensive DIME analysis of
the Russian Federation, the United States, and American allies in the West, this thesis makes the
argument that there is indeed a new Cold War and offers qualitative analysis and policy
recommendations in the face of this new threat.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Twentieth Century saw the ultimate level of violence by a multitude of actors in one
half and then the threat of complete and utter destruction in the other. The first half witnessed the
end of a system of imperial subjugation that had been in place for centuries. The second half
observed the beginning and end of a system in which two competing powers, known as
bipolarity, where one actor in the contest outlasted the other until existence was no longer
physically feasible. This second half century has been known as the Cold War and was contested
between the Soviet Union in the East and the United States in the West. The consequences of
that conflict are still being felt today and have given rise to a new Cold War between the same
actors, although under new names.
To understand how this conflict today is a Cold War, one must examine what exactly one
means by that term as well as characteristics from the first Cold War between these actors. The
Miriam Webster dictionary offers a denotative definition of: “a condition of rivalry, mistrust, and
often open hostility short of violence especially between power groups (such as labor and
management).”1 The Cambridge University Press dictionary offers a similar denotative definition
for cold war: “a continuing and dangerous unfriendly situation existing between countries that
is expressed in political ways, often including threats of war.”2 Yet what comes to mind
whenever the term is used happens to be the Cold War as mentioned in the previous paragraph:
the state of conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

“Cold War,” Miriam Webster, accessed September 10, 2019, available at: https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/cold%20war.
2 “Cold War,” Cambridge University Press, accessed September 10, 2019, available at:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/cold-war.
1
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While it is controversial to openly declare, one must only use one of the two definitions
listed above to realize that the United States and the Russian Federation (Russia), the successor
state to the Soviet Union, are locked in a new state of Cold War. While the previous Cold War
was waged between the Americans and the Soviets for half a century, it is unclear how long this
new Cold War will last. At present, this conflict has been ongoing since 2014, or nearly half a
decade. It has also seen the ongoing presidential administration on one side reminiscent of strong
Soviet leadership while two administrations on the other in the continued democratic traditions
of abdication of power through constitutional term limits.
This new Cold War is being fought across the four main instruments of power:
Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic known as DIME. Within the Diplomatic realm,
the United States has maintained its relationship with previous Cold War era allies (mainly
NATO) as well as Cold War era adversaries in former Warsaw Pact countries who have joined
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This has increased the size of power of what is
generally known as ‘the West’. The Russian Federation has also turned to new allies, chiefly
those already in contention with the United States and the West: China, Iran, North Korea, and
Syria.
Militarily speaking, the Russian Federation has set out on a campaign to revitalize and
modernize its military. This has led to the establishment of new military brigades, advancements
in technology, and even a renewed focus on its nuclear arsenal. NATO and the West have
responded in similar fashion, repopulating Europe with large numbers of American and other
allied forces for the first time since the previous Cold War. While there in response to the fear of
escalations, such fears may be realized due to proxy wars between Russia and the West being
fought in Ukraine and Syria.
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These proxy wars have also led to multiple rounds of international sanctioning by
Western countries against Russia for its part in fomenting war in both Ukraine and Syria. The
results of these sanctions have had mixed results but have led Russia to focus on new economic
partnerships with countries already at odds with the West, which seems to further increase
tensions and continuously drive the world into another East versus West confrontation. The final
instrument of power used for this new Cold War is information, which might end up being the
defining factor of this Cold War.
Reminiscent of the first Cold War, information and misinformation will play a pivotal role
in the way that Russia and the West interact with one another. The West prides itself on the liberal
access to information while Russia maintains a firm hold on what information is allowed to be
published to its people. The advancements of technology that followed the end of the first Cold
War led to the Internet and wide access to information at the press of the button. Today, those
advancements have gone even further into “social media” whereby information can be gained or
manipulated even faster than previously thought. It is in this realm, in conjunction with other cyber
capabilities (such as cyber weapons and network penetration) that leads to this defining factor
previously mentioned. In short, that as nuclear weapons were the defining weapons of the previous
Cold War, so will cyber capabilities and information/disinformation be the defining weapons of
this Cold War.
THE ESCALATION LADDER
In 1956, American military strategist Herman Khan wrote On Escalation: Metaphors and
Scenarios to discuss the state of security during the Cold War between the United States and
Soviet Union. The most important aspect from the work comes in Chapter Two, where Khan
details what he calls “the Escalation Ladder”, or a visual and metaphorical representation of the
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escalation of tensions between opposing powers.3 Khan’s ladder has 44 rungs and is broken up
into seven subsections: “sub crisis maneuvering”, “traditional crises”, “intense crises”, “bizarre
crises”, “exemplary central attacks”, “military central wars”, and “civilian central wars.”4 The
escalation ladder is visualized in the figure on the following page.
Khan also states within this work that it is important to note that the rungs of the
escalation ladder are fluid, being dynamic and allowing for simultaneous ascension and
descension within the various subsections of the ladder. While the contest that Khan witnessed in
the 20th Century ended with the complete dissolvement of the Soviet Union, the nuclear arsenal
possessed by that power has been transferred to its successor state and his theoretical framework
in an era of geothermal nuclear warfare remains as important today as it did when he was writing
the theory. For this purpose, it feels appropriate to apply Khan’s escalation ladder to the current
conflict between the United States and the Russian Federation as various rungs in Khan’s model
have been crossed in escalation of the crisis between the two powers. In the following sections of
this literature review, escalation of the various subsections and rungs of the escalation ladder will
be mentioned and demonstrated.

3
4

Herman Khan, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, (NY: Praegar, 1965), 37-51.
Khan, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, 39.

4

Figure 1.1: The Escalation Ladder
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CHAPTER 2: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OVER THE COURSE OF THE
CONFLICT
THE UNITED STATES
The Obama Presidency
The Obama Presidency saw tensions escalate and relations deteriorate. President Obama
and his administration were responsible for punishing Russia following the events in Ukraine.
This was a period where businesses and individuals associated with the Kremlin and President
Putin were increasingly sanctioned by United States, further isolating Russia from the global
community. These tensions, the actions in Ukraine, and international sanctions came to a
forefront in 2014. As time went on, President Obama and President Putin had increasingly less
contact. Both sides were also intent on reducing the level of communication channels between
both nations. Rhetoric was becoming increasingly harsh, yet it was not until the end of 2016
when the Obama administration realized that it had directly been attacked by Russian agents in
preparation for a new President.
Following the Presidential elections at the end of 2016, President Obama ordered the
expulsion of several Russian diplomats ousted as Russian agents. President Obama also ordered
two different Russian compounds on American soil to be raided and shut down by the FBI.
The Trump Presidency
President Trump has repeatedly stated that relations between the United States and the
Russian Federation were the worst they have ever been. This has been supported by research
from the Pew Center, which found that nearly 68% of Americans distrust Russians and President
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Vladimir Putin.5 President Trump has also publicly stated that he looks to rectify relations
between the United States and Russia and justified doing so by reminding Americans that the
two nations are the two largest nuclear powers. His sentiments are the antithesis to those of law
makers on Capitol Hill.
Since the inauguration of President Trump, lawmakers from the Democratic Party have stated that Russia
and the United States are enemies, with this originating from their blatant attack on the U.S. Presidential
Election (which resulted in the presidency of Donald Trump). Lawmakers from the Republican Party had
fought this assertion early on. Yet following the U.S.-Russian Summit in Helsinki in July of 2018,
Republican lawmakers on Capitol Hill joined their Democratic counterparts in protesting the President’s
moves to reestablish relations with Russia. While intended to amend relations between the two countries,
the summit only fanned the flames of hostilities on the part of the American public and increased the
distrust that the American public have in their president. What the summit achieved was a further
delegitimization of President Trump and to turn the Congress against the President in response to his failure
of holding President Putin and Russia accountable for meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections.6

Congressional lawmakers have voiced their concerns over President Trump and U.S.
relations with the Russian Federation to his administration as well. At the Senate confirmation
hearing for Mike Pompeo to be Secretary of State, Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey asked
Mike Pompeo what the administration would do to curb, “an aggressive Russia who seeks to
undermine the international order we helped create after World War II.”7 Mr. Pompeo responded
by stating that, if confirmed, he would do everything in his power to push for the end of Russian
aggression in Ukraine, and work to ensure the security of other countries from Russian aggression.8
Months later, in July of 2018, Mike Pompeo faced similar concerns from the Senate and announced
that the U.S. would be revealing the “Crimea Declaration”, which formally announces the U.S.

Kristin Bialik, “Putin Remains Overwhelmingly Unpopular in the United States,” Pew Research Center, March
26, 2018, available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/26/putin-remains-overwhelmingly-unpopularin-the-united-states/.
6 Lauren Fox, “Top Republicans in Congress Break with Trump Over Putin Comments,” CNN, July 16, 2018,
available at: https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/16/politics/congress-reaction-trump-putin-comments/index.html. Jamie
Ehrlich, “Republican Sen. Ben Sasse: Trump Should Declare Russia an ‘Enemy of America,’” CNN, July 16, 2018,
available at: https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/16/politics/ben-sasse-putin-trump-russia-enemy/index.html.
7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Hon. Mike Pompeo to be Secretary of
State, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., 2018, 7. Available at:
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S.%20HRG.%20115%20339%20Pompeo1.pdf.
8 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, Nomination of Mike Pompeo, 104-133.
5
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position of non-recognition of Russian control of Crimea.9 The declaration itself specifically calls
on the Russian Federation to, “end its occupation of Crimea” and respect the rules of the
international order, under the auspices of the United Nations Charter, which Russia is an adherent
to in, “pledging to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”10 Beyond this act of refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Russian
control of Crimea, the administration has broken cooperation with the Russian Federation in other
arenas, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). On February 2, 2019,
amidst continued alleges of Russian violation of the treaty, Secretary Pompeo formally announced
the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty.11
THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union has officially taken a similar stance to the U.S. in condemning the
Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilizing Ukraine. One particular action taken by the
European Union has been to enact “EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in
Ukraine.”12 Specifically, the diplomatic measures have been to cancel the “EU-Russia summit”,
choosing to no longer hold regular bilateral summits as well as move the G8 summit (scheduled
in 2014 to be in Sochi, Russia) to Brussels, and renaming it the G7 summit, deciding to forego
the summit of 8 leading world countries in favor of 7, which continues to this day. The legal
basis for the partnership between the European Union and the Russian Federation has been the

9

An Update on American Diplomacy to Advance our National Security Strategy, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of
Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State). Available at:
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/072518_Pompeo_Testimony.pdf.
10 State Department Press Service, “Crimea Declaration,” published July 25, 2018, available at:
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284508.htm.
11 State Department Press Service, “U.S. Intent to Withdraw from the INF Treaty February 2, 2019,” published
February 2, 2019, available at: https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/02/288722.htm.
12 European Council, “EU Restrictive Measures in Response to the Crisis in Ukraine,” accessed September 9, 2019,
available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/.

8

“Partnership and Cooperation Agreement”, which was signed in 1997 and meant for renewal
every ten years.
The European Parliament admits that in 2014, the European Council froze cooperation with
Russia, “except on cross-border cooperation and people-to-people contacts.”13 The Russian
Federation, when announcing the 20th anniversary of the agreement, acknowledged that “Bilateral
sectoral dialogues became bogged down that used to provide effective mechanisms for direct
cooperation between Russian federal executive bodies and relevant branches of the European
Commission. A great number of channels of cooperation were frozen.”14 The Russian mission to
the European continued its statement by remaining hopeful that long-term goals will thaw these
channels and cooperation may continue.
NATO
In 2017, NATO Secretary Jen Stoltenberg unequivocally stated, “We do not want to isolate
Russia. NATO does not want a new Cold War.”15 That being said, NATO has taken the same
actions as the European Union (of which the majority of member states are also EU members) and
the United States in condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine. NATO officially has stated, “All
practical civilian and military cooperation under the NRC with Russia has been suspended since
April 2014, in response to Russia’s military intervention and aggressive actions in Ukraine, and
its illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea.”16 The NRC, in the aforementioned quote, is the
NATO-Russia Council, which is its diplomatic delegation to the Russian Federation. The alliance

European Parliament, “Relations Beyond the Neighborhood: Russia,” accessed September 9, 2019, available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/177/russia.
14 Foreign Ministry Press Service, “Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Turns 20,” published
December 1, 2017, available at: https://russiaeu.ru/en/news/russia-eu-partnership-and-cooperation-agreement-turns20.
15 NATO Press Service, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Plenary session at the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly in Bucharest,” published October 9, 2017, available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/ra/natohq/opinions_147635.htm?selectedLocale=en.
16 “Relations with Russia,” NATO, August 5, 2019, available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/ra/natohq/topics_50090.htm.
13
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has also publicly condemned Russia for a chemical attack on British soil in 2018 as well as voiced
its collective judgement that Russia has violated the terms of the INF Treaty in 2019, supporting
the U.S. decision to withdraw from the agreement in retaliation.17 NATO’s official policy is that
relations with Russia cannot return to their former amiable state until Russia returns to
“compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.”18
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
At the 2016 Munich Security Conference, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev
stated, “speaking bluntly, we are rapidly rolling into a period of a new cold war.”19 Prime
Minister Medvedev’s declaration of a “New Cold War” was in realization of the current state of
geo-politics. Since the actions of Russia in 2014, cooperation between the Russian Federation
and its adversaries in the West have come to a halt. Another facet of this realization came in
2014 when President Putin approved a revised military doctrine which takes the official stance
that NATO is the greatest existential threat to the Russian state.20 Having faced international
isolation from the West, Russia has opted to turn to the East for international cooperation.
In a bid to turn to the East, Russia announced interest in increasing bilateral relations and
cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2014.21 Also, in 2014, Russia was able to
successfully implement its goal of a Eurasian Economic Union of former Soviet states and
Eurasian countries. Russia has also been focused on increasing its bilateral relationship with
“Relations with Russia,” NATO, 2019.
NATO Press Service, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” published July 9, 2016, available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.
19 Kremlin Press Service. “Dmitry Medvedev’s Speech at the Panel Discussion,” published February 14, 2016,
available at: http://government.ru/en/news/21784/.
20 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, article 12, sub a, sec. 2. Available at:
https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029.
21 Foreign Ministry Press Service, “Remarks and Answers to Questions from the Media by Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov During a Joint News Conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Moscow, 29 August 2014,” published August 29, 2014 available at:
http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ir/-/asset_publisher/HUPBmpXjn4Ob/content/id/672783.
17
18
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China.22 In 2018, at a press conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President
Vladimir Putin stated, “We consider the strengthening of direct ties between Russian regions
and Chinese provinces to be especially important.”23

CHAPTER 3: WEAPONIZATION OF INFORMATION
STATE CONTROL OF INFORMATION
In Russia, there is no foreign ownership of mass media allowed.24 This law was furthered
in November of 2017 when President Putin signed into law criminal penalties for breaking this
law, which include prison time and fiscal penalties of up to 5 million Rubles, or roughly $85,000.25
The State Department protested this move by the Russian government, but as mentioned
previously, has had the difficulty of dealing with a Russia that maintains the worst diplomatic
relationship with the United States since the height of the Cold War.
STATE PROPAGANDA
RT
RT, formerly known as Russia Today, is a Russian state-run propaganda machine. This is
a unified view throughout the United States government, ranging from the Intelligence and Law
Enforcement Communities to Congress and the State Department. In one of the last reports under
the leadership of James Clapper, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) stated,

Kremlin Press Service, “Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union Signed,” published May 29, 2014, available at:
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45787.
23 Kremlin Press Service, “Press Statements Following Talks with President of China Xi Jinping,” published
September 11, 2018, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58528.
24 Kremlin Press Service, “Law Limiting Foreign Shareholders’ Stakes in Russian Media Outlets,” published
October 15, 2014, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46796.
25 Kremlin Press Service, “Amendments to the Law on Information and the Law on the Media”, published
November 25, 2017, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/56179. “Russian State Duma Eyeing Fines as High
as $85,000 for Violating Foreign Agent Media Law,” TASS, November 29, 2017, available at:
http://tass.com/politics/977957.
22
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“The Kremlin’s principal international propaganda outlet is RT.”26 This assertion that RT is a
Russian state-run organization was supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, who pressured
T&R Productions to register as a foreign agent working on behalf of ANO TV-Novosti (the
Russian government entity behind RT) in November of 2017.27 Acting Assistant Attorney General
Boente declared, “Americans have a right to know who is acting in the United States to influence
the U.S. government or public on behalf of foreign principals,” when announcing the registration
of T&R Productions under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
The Troll Factory
Just as vital to the information war has been the use of propaganda through online “trolls”
at Russia’s online “troll factory”. In 2015, British newspaper The Daily Mail reported that the
Russian government was sponsoring the fabrication of stories on online social media to draw
more attention to Putin and increase his popularity. 28 The article explained that the factory would
be open 24 hours a day and teams would operate in groups of three, working 12-hour shifts and
fabricating over 100 stories per shift, with the aim of spreading Anti-Americanism and AntiWestern sentiments. Later in that year, The Guardian had reported that a Russian court
recognized the existence of the troll factory when a free-lance journalist, who worked for the

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, Background to “Assessing Russian
Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution
(Washington D.C., 2017), 3, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
27 U.S. Department of Justice Press Service, “Production Company Registers Under the Foreign Agent Registration
Act as Agent for the Russian Government Entity Responsible for Broadcasting RT,” published November 13, 2017,
available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/production-company-registers-under-foreign-agent-registration-actagent-russian-government.
28 Sam Matthew, “Revealed: How Russia’s ‘Troll Factory’ Runs Thousands of Fake Twitter and Facebook
Accounts to Flood Social Media with Pro-Putin Propaganda”, The Daily Mail, March 28, 2015,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3015996/How-Russia-s-troll-factory-runs-thousands-fake-TwitterFacebook-accounts-flood-social-media-pro-Putin-propaganda.html.
26
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troll factory, sued for damages and won.29 The economic award was one ruble, but the symbolic
award was forcing the government to admit its involvement in the sponsoring of propaganda on a
massive scale.
The exposure of the troll factory does not seem to have slowed down the Russian
propaganda machine. In fall of 2017, social media mega corporation Facebook announced that
$100,000 worth of advertisement space was purchased by Russian customers during and following
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.30 Facebook announced that the money was linked to over
3,000 advertisements targeting the promotion of controversial domestic issues in the United States,
such as race tensions, gun rights, immigration, and LGBT rights. The investment seems to have
paid off as public division has increased. One of the ways that this was achieved was through
meddling with political activist groups, such as Black Lives Matter, and influencing these social
groups to draw negative attention and negative sentiments from their opponents.31 However, this
move may have become a double-edged sword for the Russians as American media focus on
Russia quickly increased, and not in a positive manner.
CAMPAIGNS OF INFLUENCE
The European Union
Russia has conducted campaigns of influence across the European Union. It has
particularly targeted the EU member states of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In Hungary,
this influence operation has included pushing pro-Kremlin propaganda in legitimate news sources
“Woman who Sued Pro-Putin Russian ‘Troll Factory’ Gets One Rouble in Damages”, The Guardian, August 17,
2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/18/woman-who-sued-pro-putin-russian-troll-factory-gets-onerouble-in-damages.
30 Alex Stamos, “An Update on Information Operations on Facebook”, Facebook, September 06, 2017,
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/09/information-operations-update/.
31 Brian Ross, Matthew Mosk, Randy Kreider, Cho Park, and Alex Hosenball, “Russian Internet Trolls Sought to
Co-opt Unwitting American Activists”, Good Morning America, October 18, 2017,
https://www.yahoo.com/gma/russian-internet-trolls-sought-co-opt-unwitting-american-210504700--abc-newstopstories.html.
29
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as well as through online blogs viewed by far-right populists.32 Across the EU, Russian propaganda
has been aimed at ethnic Russian populations to incite nationalist feelings in an attempt to
undermine domestic support for member states and their stances of isolating Russia from the
international stage.33 In France and Germany, specifically, the target was governmental leadership,
in the forms of the Presidency in France and the German Parliament.34
The United States Election
In December of 2016, President Barack Obama announced a set of retaliations, “to the
Russian government’s aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at the
U.S. election.”35 In his announcement, President Obama referred to a government report that had
been published earlier that year. The FBI and DHS released a joint statement that said that they
were confident that the Russian government used cyber means to meddle in the US Presidential
election.36 In the detailed Joint Action Report (JAR), the two US government entities attributed
the attacks to APT28 and APT29.37 The JAR goes into detail how APT29 began targeting the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 2015 while APT28 began its attack in spring of 2016.
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https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.
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The JAR states that APT29 began its assault by launching a spear phishing campaign that
targeted over 1,000 US government personnel. The campaign sent malware to be installed on
internal networks once personnel opened malicious links under the guise of opening honest and
authentic links. The malware included many different Remote Access Tools (RATs) that allowed
APT29 unauthorized systems access to these networks. APT28 launched a similar attack in 2016,
but the objective was to steal user credentials by having personnel change passwords. This
allowed APT28 access to the same networks to work its attack. Beyond the technical means,
Russia was able to weaponize information for this campaign through the use of propaganda in an
effort of “divide and conquer”, using the American public to achieve its end goal.
In fall of 2017, social media mega corporation Facebook announced that $100,000 worth
of advertisement space was purchased by Russian customers during and following the 2016 US
Presidential election.38 Facebook announced that the money was linked to over 3,000
advertisements targeting the promotion of controversial domestic issues in the United States,
such as race tensions, gun rights, immigration, and LGBT rights. One particular method was
through meddling with political activist groups, such as Black Lives Matter, and influencing
these social groups to draw negative attention and negative sentiments from their opponents.39
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CHAPTER 4: MILITARY
MODERNIZATION AND FORCE BUILDUP
While tensions between the United States and Russia have deteriorated and Russia has
been waging an information war, it has also been modernizing and building its military. In 2009,
then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that Russia would be dedicated to conventional
and nuclear weapon modernization.40 Two years later, while still discussing friendly relations
with the United States and the West, President Medvedev warned that both countries would
remain focused on their own national interests, which could spark an arms race if American
missile defense interfered with Russian nuclear parity attempts.41 Fears of that arms race started
to materialize within weeks of the formal American withdrawal from the INF Treaty: eight years
after Medvedev’s warning.
On August 5, 2019, President Putin declared that Russia would be monitoring American
development of missiles that had been prohibited under the INF Treaty.42 Within weeks, the
Pentagon announced that they had test launched ground based Patriot Cruise Missiles, which are
normally launched from ships.43 Within the week, Moscow responded with President Putin
ordering a “symmetrical response” to the U.S. missile test.44 The following day, the Russian
Ministry of Defence followed through with President Putin’s orders and test fired submarine
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launched ballistic missiles, the second such test within a span of three weeks.45 Since
Medvedev’s promise, it seems that Russia has indeed been building up its military in the form of
increasing naval size, increasing army size, modernization of aircraft, and concentration on
buildup of nuclear weapons.
This focus on remilitarization has strained relations to a point where former Soviet
satellite nations that are now American allies are split ethnically between Pro-American and ProRussian sentiments. NATO troops have also become a daily site as these nations prepare for an
aggressive Russian invasion styled on the intervention in Ukraine. The presence of thousands of
allied troops from Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States being
stationed in the region is a direct response to Russia conducting snap exercises with numbers
estimated between 30,000 and 80,000 and the announcement of the creation of three new
divisions in the western half of the country. 46 Further south, the alliance has created a new
NATO station in Romania.47 This force will consist of 900 US troops, 4,000 Romanian troops,
and be supplemented with additional troops from other allied countries. This station will be
tasked with monitoring Russia in the Black Sea while the force up north will monitor Russia’s
presence along the Baltic Sea and Baltic States. This increase in troops from the US to Europe
marks the largest force that the US has sent to Europe since the height of the Cold War.48 This
large force, and large expanse of NATO territory since the end of the Cold War, have only
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moved to deteriorate tensions and further increase the state of the New Cold War.49 One of these
threats comes in the form of missiles and adhering to international treaties.
In the 2017 State Department report on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF
Treaty), the US found Russia to be in continued violation of the INF Treaty, which was signed in
1987.50 The INF Treaty is an international agreement between the US and Russia to eliminate
nuclear capable ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. In response to
the perceived Russian violations of the INF Treaty, Congress voted to deny funding for the Open
Skies Treaty as well as signed a provision in the new National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
that the US would no longer be bound by domestic law to following the INF Treaty if Russia does
not return to a state of following the treaty within 15 months of the signing of the provision.51 The
same provision would also halt funding of the START Treaty between the two nations and undo
the efforts at reducing the US arsenal of nuclear weapons that helped end the Cold War between
the US and the Soviet Union.
PROXY WARS
Ukraine
Russia has fomented war and invasion of South Eastern Ukraine, in the provinces of
Donetsk and Luhansk, known as the Donbass. This has been through covert means of deploying
Russian forces to fight in southeastern Ukraine. These Russian forces, specifically special forces,
are being deployed in unmarked uniforms and using other means to conceal their Russian

49 Stephen

F. Cohen, “The New Cold War is Already More Dangerous than was its Predecessor”, The Nation,
October 11, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/the-new-cold-war-is-already-more-dangerous-than-was-itspredecessor/.
50 “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments”, United States Department of State, accessed October 31, 2017,
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270330.htm#PART II.
51 The Open Skies Treaty is an international agreement that allows nations to monitor foreign militaries to fly over
their territory and make observations.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Public Law 115-911, U.S. Statutes at Large 131 (2017):
383.

18

identity. When a small contingent of these soldiers were captured in southeastern Ukraine, they
also stated that they were “on holiday”, but that refusal to fight meant prison terms for
disobeying orders.52 In a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry,
Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk stated,
It seems to me that the only country who strongly deny clear military Russian boots on the ground is
Russian Federation and personally President Putin. If they need, I can give them my glasses. While crystal
clear that Russian military is on the ground, crystal clear that it was Russia who invaded Crimea, Russia
invaded the east of Ukraine, because frankly, it’s a little bit difficult to buy SA-11 and SA-22 and Russian
tanks and Russian Howitzers and Russian artillery at the marketplace in Donetsk or Lugansk. We have
strong evidences and grounds that Russian Federation violated an international law and Russian president
ordered Russian troops to invade both Crimea and the east of Ukraine. We are not fighting with so-called
rebels or guerillas. We are fighting with the Russian regular army. 53

Secretary of State Kerry, for his part seemed to support Prime Minister Yatsenyuk’s
statement with,
Let me add to that that social media is filled with comment – and on occasion, photos – of Russian soldiers
being returned to Russia dead, and parents in Russia being told a lie that their children, their sons, died in
an accident somewhere. And there are other stories. I won’t go into them at great length now except to say
to you that there are intercepts of conversations of orders being given by people who are discernibly
Russian. There are references – there’s a person in captivity today who has recently given evidence of his
own role with respect to these kinds of decisions. So enough is enough. 54

Russia, for its part, still denies any involvement in sponsoring the war in southeastern
Ukraine. In April of 2016, President Putin stated that Russia was intent on restoring peace in
Ukraine, but that it was facing sanctions and international backlash from the West, that it was, in
fact, the victim of Western aggression.55 This is in stark contrast to President Barack Obama’s
statement that, “Russia is responsible for the violence in eastern Ukraine. The violence is
encouraged by Russia. The separatists are trained by Russia. They are armed by Russia. They are
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funded by Russia.”56 In 2018, following in the footsteps of President Obama, the Trump White
House released its position that Russia “invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014” and
continued by announcing further support for the Ukrainian government’s armed forces.57
In November of 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed, “On the Introduction
of Martial Law in Ukraine" in retaliation for “wide-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian armed
forces” and an attack on Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait.58 In February of 2019,
President Poroshenko also publicly announced his desires for Ukraine to join both NATO and the
EU. He explicitly stated, “We know that only membership in NATO and the EU, which will ensure
a strong development of democracy and the rule of law, economy and living standards of Ukraine,
can guarantee peace and freedom to Ukraine, as well as to all the neighbors of Russia.”59 To date,
the conflict has seen over 10,000 deaths and over 1.3 million people displaced from their homes.
Syria
The U.S. has been in Syria since the start of the conflict. The most drastic event involving
U.S. forces was the 2018 airstrike on Syrian military assets. President Trump declared, “My
fellow Americans, a short time ago, I ordered the United States Armed Forces to launch
precision strikes on targets associated with the chemical weapons capabilities of Syrian dictator
Bashar al-Assad.”60 Russia entered the Syrian Civil War, in 2015, in defense of the Bashar Al-
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Assad Regime, albeit if officially to “fight international terrorism.”61 Russia’s military presence
in Syria was meant to be limited to air operations (with no mention of exclusion of special
forces).62 In 2016, Reuters reported that Russian forces were exceeding their declared presence
in Syria by using private military contractors (PMCs).63 The presence of these military
contractors, or “mercenaries” in common usage, would also become important when kinetically
contacting U.S. forces.
The direct contact between Russian and American forces came in the form of a fire fight
when Russia’s “little green men” aided pro-Assad forces contact the Syrian Democratic Forces,
who happened to be accompanied by U.S. Special Forces.64 The Pentagon did not state the
presence of the Russian forces in the pro-Assad attack in an immediate release, but in a New
York Times article two months later, it appears that the Pentagon did admit to this.6566 The New
York Times article claims that the pro-Assad and Russian force sustained 200-300 casualties
while the U.S. backed Syrian Democratic Forces sustained no casualties. Also, in 2018, the
White House released a briefing which stated that Russia was continuing to exacerbate the
Syrian Civil War in support of Assad.67
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CYBER WARFARE
In 2012, General Michael Hayden, former director of both the NSA and the CIA,
declared that the modern era was one of cyber as a recognized domain of conflict. Hayden
specifically stated, “We have entered into a new phase of conflict in which we use a
cyberweapon to create physical destruction, and in this case, physical destruction in someone
else's critical infrastructure.”68 General Hayden was referring to the cyber attack on the Tehran
nuclear facility attributed to a cyber weapon known as Stuxnet. Department of Homeland
Security’s National Protection and Programs Directorate Deputy Under Secretary Philip
Reitinger testified to House Committee on Homeland Security
A real-world threat emerged last year that significantly changed the landscape of targeted cyber attacks on
industrial control systems. Malicious code, dubbed Stuxnet, was detected in July 2010. DHS analysis
concluded that this highly complex computer worm was the first of its kind, written to specifically target
mission-critical control systems running a specific combination of software and hardware. 69

In 2012, David Sanger wrote for the New York Times that Stuxnet was a part of a larger
campaign of cyber weapons, citing sources “involved in the program.”70 Sanger also discussed
former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, as wanting to
design a new type of cyber weapon, which was authorized under the Bush administration and
then accelerated under the Obama administration. The U.S. government then investigated the
sources of the leak, and blamed Cartwright, going as far as to indict him for lying to the FBI
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during the investigation.71 The leaks confirmed that U.S. cyber capabilities had evolved to a state
to, as General Hayden stated, create physical destruction through the use of a cyber weapon.
However, the U.S. is not the only state with this capability.
Russian Cyber Operations
Estonia
Russia’s cyber experiment started with a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
against Estonia in 2007. The flood of traffic in Estonian cyber infrastructure was the result of
punishment for Estonia altering with their Soviet past by moving a Soviet era statue from one
location to another.72 This successful episode of Russia’s cyber experiment effectively shut
down day to day online operations in Estonia’s cyber infrastructure for weeks, from news outlets
to government institutions, and increased Russia’s confidence to continue experimenting with
cyber means as a weapon against adversaries. The next targets would become Georgia in 2008
and Ukraine in 2015.
Georgia
The cyber-attack on Georgia was conducted in tandem with the Five Days War of 2008,
whereby Georgia was fighting separatists in a contested region and Russia intervened on the part
of those separatists. This attack was another example of a DDoS attack, but the goals were to
ensure that the Georgian people had no idea what was going on as well as ensure that
communication between Georgian military forces was disrupted.73 This was achieved with
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relative ease as Georgia’s online infrastructure was reliant on connections based in Russia and
Turkey. By controlling the flow of incoming traffic to Georgia, Russia was effectively able to
counter Georgian defensive cyber actions, going as far as rerouting their attacks, to appear as if
originating in China as Georgia attempted to block incoming Russian traffic.74 The Russian
attack on Ukraine went even further than the aforesaid DDoS attacks of the past.
Ukraine
In December of both 2015 and 2016, power companies in Ukraine were attacked through
cyber means. The 2015 attack targeted the Prykarpattyaoblenergo power facility in Western
Ukraine while the 2016 attack targeted the Kyivoblenergo power facility north of the national
capital.75 The Prykarpattyaoblenergo attack was the first attack of its kind on a power company
while the Kyivoblenergo attack was an escalation and confirmation of cyber capabilities. These
attacks are also only the second ever recorded cyber-attacks against physical critical
infrastructure (the first being the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear facility).76 The cyberattacks targeted Information Control Systems (ICS) for the Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) network, which allow for operations of advanced systems at plants and
factories. The level of sophistication needed for such an operation indicates that there was
coordination between a nation state and criminal organizations.77 To date, there has not been
direct attribution to Russian Intelligence services, but a Russian criminal organization,
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Sandworm, has been attributed to be the source of the attacks. The likelihood of this being a
Russian operation greatly increases when one acknowledges the fact that Russia has been
sponsoring the armed conflict in the Donbass since early 2014. This likelihood also increases
when one takes into account the US government attributing the US Presidential election
meddling to APT28 and APT29: groups associated with the Russian Intelligence Services.
United States
When CIA Director Mike Pompeo spoke at the annual security conference at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, he discussed how the Russian meddling in the
Presidential election was nothing new and will only increase in the future. He also stated, “Until
there is a new leader in Russia, I suspect it will be a threat to the United States for a long time.”78
Director Pompeo also stated that he believed that the United States can expect interference in the
2018 and 2020 election cycles. He also explicitly stated that it is the intelligence community’s
job to ensure that no one, whether it be a nation state like China or Russia or transnational
criminal groups like Al-Qaeda, can meddle with the Presidential elections. He ended this
discussion with saying that they will, “find ways to push back against it. We are intent on doing
that and we have a lot of resources devoted to it. I am optimistic that we will continue to reduce
the capacity of anyone to meddle with the election.” Although their technology may have
changed and increased, the Russians have found other ways to conduct their information war
against the United States.
It has also come out that, like in Ukraine, Russia has begun experimenting with attacking
key critical national infrastructure (KCNI) in the United States. This came in the form of
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sustained attacks on energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical
manufacturing networks.79 Unlike Ukraine however, following the successes of the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election, the Trump administration has ensured that the government would be
prepared for continued cyber operations against the United States. As previously mentioned in
this section, CIA Director Mike Pompeo declared that the view of the U.S. Intelligence
Community was that Russia would attempt to repeat this attack on the American election cycle
in 2018 (known as the midterm elections), and perhaps even 2020 with the next Presidential
election. In August of 2018, Gen. Paul M. Nakasone stated,
U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency are tracking a wide range of foreign cyber
adversaries, and are prepared to conduct operations against those actors attempting to undermine our
nation’s mid-term elections…I have complete confidence in the forces under my command. We will work
in conjunction with other elements of our government to make sure we bring the full power of our nation to
bear on any foreign power that attempts to interfere with our democratic processes.80

In October of 2018, the New York Times reported that USCYBERCOM had begun to
fulfill General Nakasone’s declaration and had begun targeted operations against Russians in
preparation for the 2018 midterm elections, but that defense officials with the DOD would not go
into specific details on the ongoing operations.81 The news from the New York Times article
coincided with the timing of General Nakasone speaking to attendees at the 2018 Southeast
Region Cyber Security & Technology Symposium at Chapel Hill regarding Cyber Threats and
Solutions to National Security.82 These efforts to combat Russian meddling attempts have
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already resulted in the indictments of 13 Russians, including 12 Russian Military Intelligence
(GRU) officer, in connection with the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election as well as the 2018
midterm elections.83 However, the DOJ indictment indicates that the charged Russian, Elena
Alekseevna Khusyaynova, was in charge of an operating budget of $35 million, which is
extremely alarming when one considers that only $100,000 of advertisement space on Facebook
successfully worked to divide and polarize the American public.
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CHAPTER 5: ECONOMIC
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS
United States
On March 6, 2014 U.S. President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13660, which
began issuing economic sanctions against those responsible for the violations of Ukraine’s
sovereignty related to Crimea and Southeastern Ukraine.84 These sanctions included property
within the territory of the United States, financial donations or contributions made to sanctioned
individuals, and certain financial transactions with individuals being sanctioned. The executive
order concluded by authorizing the U.S. Treasury Department to immediately begin freezing
assets and assuming control of the sanctioned property. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, penalties for violating these sanctions (on U.S. citizens) can range from $250,000 to
$1,000,000 and prison time up to 20 years in prison.85
Two weeks later, on March 17th (the same day the EU enacted its sanctions), President
Obama announced that he was taking further steps to sanction Russian individuals and entities
connected to these violations against Ukraine.86 In the same speech, President Obama stated, “I
told President Putin yesterday, the referendum in Crimea was a clear violation of Ukrainian
constitutions and international law, and it will not be recognized by the international
community.” With the said penalties, it seems that President Obama’s declaration to President
Putin was also a warning: we are serious and intend to end this aggressive assertive action.
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In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump decided to take like action. In April of 2018, the
administration released news that President Trump had decided to increase economic sanctions
against Russian officials and entities. The information specifically states that seven oligarchs, 12
companies they own, 17 senior Russian officials, and state-owned weapons manufacturers would
be targeted.87 A Congressional Research Services report from January of 2019 states that
Congress remains skeptical of the new administration’s dedication to the previous
administration’s sanctions.88 That being said, under the Trump administration, there have been
two amendments to President Obama’s Executive Orders on the sanctions to increase them, and
include companies capable of transactions that would further Russian explorations in the Arctic
for the purposes of oil and other natural resources.89 As of 2019, it appears that the U.S. and its
Western allies remain resolute on sanctioning the Russian Federation until its assertive actions in
Ukraine come to a conclusion.
European Union
On March 17, 2014, the European Union, through the European Council, adopted
restrictive measures against those “threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence of Ukraine.”90 Under Article 2 of the March 17th decision, economic assets
belonging to persons or entities connected to the actions in Ukraine were to be frozen in EU
member states.91 Also on March 17th, the European Council sanctioned 21 individuals connected
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to the territorial violations against the sovereignty of Ukraine. Starting on May 12th of 2014,
entities began being sanctioned as well. This first materialized with the sanctions of PJSC
Chernomorneftegaz (an oil and gas company in Crimea) and Feodosia Enterprises (a shipyard
and ship builder in Crimea).92
The decision from March 17th, 2014 was set to expire on March 18th, 2018. Since its
adoption, and before its expiration, 161 individuals and 41 entities have been sanctioned. These
individuals range from separatist leaders in Crimea and Southeastern Ukraine to members of the
Russian government, such as Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, while the entities range
from ship builders and weapons manufacturers to financial institutions like Russian National
Commercial Bank.93 Data from the World Bank has fossil fuels at 70% of Russia’s total exports
in 2013 and weapons from 6%-8% (depending on whether you are classifying them under metal
and metal products or vehicles and equipment) for the same period.94 The same report reexamined the percentages of Russian exports for 2017 and found that fossil fuels had gone down
to 59% of exports while the arms (again under this classification) had risen to 8%-11%.95
Vladimir Isachenkov of the Associated Press reported in 2017 that Russian arms exports were
expected to hit $50 billion for the year. In an article for the Jamestown Foundation, a policy
think tank, Anna Borshchevskaya wrote that Russian arms exports were worth $21.4 billion in
the Middle East and North Africa alone, and that this region was second to Asia in terms of
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Russian exports.96 The focus on selling Russian arms abroad seems to be a reaction to the
sanctions from the European Union and the West, but also to the volatile global prices in oil, of
which Russia depends on for its economy.
STATE OF OIL PRICES THROUGHOUT CONFLICT
Since 2014, oil prices have dropped and merely begun to recover in 2018 and 2019. With
the Russian economy so heavily dependent on oil, analysts have predicted that Russia loses $2
billion per 1 U.S. dollar drop in price per barrel of oil.97 The reason this is so significant is that in
2014, the yearly high for price per barrel was $107.95 per barrel of oil, but dropped to $53.45 per
barrel.98 In 2018, the highest price soared back to $76.41 per barrel, but since the drop in 2014,
the lowest price had dropped to $26.21 per barrel.99 Another significance of these oil prices is
that Russia’s monetary unit, the Ruble, destabilized in reaction to both the sanctions and drop in
oil prices.
In December of 2014, the first year of the drop of oil prices and sanctions, the Ruble hit a
record low of 80.10 per 1 U.S. Dollar.100 Then in 2016, the year with the lowest oil prices per
barrel, the Ruble dropped to 80.92 per 1 U.S. Dollar.101 There is also a theory that in 2014, the
United States colluded with Saudi Arabia to flood the market, in efforts to punish both Russia
(from the U.S. perspective) and Iran (from the Saudi perspective), knowing that these drops in oil
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price would be a way to weaponize oil, as had been done in the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990.102 This
theory is in allusion to a meeting held between Secretary of State John Kerry and the Saudi
government in September of 2014.103
In his article for Oil Price.com, Topf lists historical cases of weaponizing oil over
geopolitical disputes. Yet, the validity of this theory may also be held up when compared to the
state of the Russian economy, which forecasted recession in 2015 in reaction to the global
decrease in oil prices.104 There is also further evidence with this theory as U.S. production has
only increased while imports have decreased in this same period. At the same time that Russia
was forecasting recession, the Guardian reported that the U.S. was importing 3.1 million barrels
of oil per day less than in 2005 and that U.S. production had already increased 65% since 2009.
Today, the U.S. Energy Information Agency forecasts further U.S. production will produce
record numbers of oil at 12.3 million barrels of oil per day in 2019 and 13.3 million barrels of oil
per day in 2020.105 Figure II displays the global price of oil from 2010 to 2019, showing peak
2014 prices and the sharp decline in prices correlating with the recession in the Russian
economy. This is important because, at the time, Russian government expenditures were based
on the forecasts of oil being priced at $100 a barrel.106
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Figure 2.1: State of Oil Prices Since 2010
It may also be a credible theory as the U.S. has been boosting its production of oil and
liquid natural gas (LNG), which also threatens Russian oil for Europe’s energy demands. In his
2019 State of the Union Address, President Trump declared, “The United States is now the
number-one producer of oil and natural gas anywhere in the world.”107 Currently, LNG is priced
at $6.20 per million British thermal units and the United States is producing 2,562 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas to meet energy needs.108109 There are currently LNG import stations in 12 EU
countries, including Poland and Lithuania, which offer direct threats to Russian oil pipelines
racing to meet Europe’s energy demands.110
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TRADE DEALS WITH CHINA, IRAN, AND NORTH KOREA
Russia has been keen on fostering new economic ties with states that are currently at odds
with the U.S. and its Western allies. Regarding China, President Putin has stated that, “We
consider the strengthening of direct ties between Russian regions and Chinese provinces to be
especially important.”111 In this same speech, President Putin had stated that bilateral trade
between Russia and China had exceeded $50 billion for 2018 with hopes of reaching $100
billion.112 In June 2019, when Chinese President Jinping visited Russia, President Putin
announced that trade had reached $108 billion.113 President Putin stated that “About 30
investment projects worth a total of $22 billion are underway with our Chinese partners and
Chinese capital. A substantial part of these funds is being invested in projects in the Russian Far
East ($3.5 billion).” This bilateral trade ranges from infrastructure projects to energy (oil and
LNG) and from manufacturing of vehicles for both civilian and military use to agricultural
projects in both countries. President Jinping’s visit to Russia in June coincided with an energy
forum that had been agreed upon by both countries in June of 2018.
During President Jinping’s visit to Russia, President Putin announced at the energy forum
that there were several projects being coordinated by Russian and Chinese companies in Siberia
and Russia’s Far East.114 In the joint press conference, President Putin announced that Chinese
investment in a joint venture in the area was valued at $3.5 billion while advocating for further
foreign investment and stating that Russia would establish economic zones along its southern
border that would allow investors to save up to 30% of costs involved in investments. President
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Xi Jinping also mentioned that the value of Russian and Chinese energy in bilateral trade was
worth $40 billion in 2018. Both acknowledge the importance of energy in their economic
partnership. While these two remain rivals, they have shown a willingness to open economic
agreements and collaborate in military exercises, to the dismay of the United States and the
West.115 Should this be indicative of the future, one can argue that this is the formation of an
“Eastern” coalition.116 Beyond China, Russia has sought partnerships with nations deemed
“rogue states” by the West. The two nations of most concern are Iran and North Korea.
In February of 2019, President Putin announced that trade between Russia and Iran had
also increased, increasing to $1.5 billion, with imports having increased by 40%, but did not state
the time frame for the growth.117 In 2017, the U.S. State Department also voiced concern over a
possible increase in trade between Russia and North Korea.118 This was in response to an article
by USA Today, citing Sputnik, which found that Russia and North Korea had seen already seen a
73% increase in trade in 2017 ahead of a summit between the two countries.119 With North
Korea, this possible increase in trade was addressed as a concern by the U.S. State
Department.120 A Brookings Institute article, written by Robert Einhorn, also detailed how
Russian entities were assisting North Korea circumvent international sanctions through the
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shipment of oil to North Korea.121 When hosting Kim Jong Un for his first foreign state visit,
President Putin and Kim both mentioned hopes of further increasing their bilateral trade,
although there was no mention of the current value of the trade or any specific projects being
conducted between the two nations.122
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ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 6: ESCALATION
This subsection of the analysis section will serve as a guide for the duration of the work,
discussing information already mentioned and introducing information that will be followed up
in further detail in the subsequent subsections of the analysis. Herman Khan’s Escalation Ladder
can be applied to the crisis today, specifically the first three subgroups of the model can be
applied to the confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West. In Figure II of the
Literature Review, you see “subcrisis maneuvering”, “traditional crises”, and “intense crises” as
these subgroups.
With “subcrisis maneuvering”, you have rungs one through three of the model. Rung one
is “ostensible crisis”, and this is specifically applied to Ukraine. When the Maidan Revolution
ousted Viktor Yanukovych, the Russian Federation responded with the illegal annexation of
Crimea and the fomentation of war in the southeastern part of the country. This led to rung two,
“political, economic, and diplomatic gestures”, as a backlash. This came in the form of the
United States and its allies in the West calling for emergency meetings of the United Nations
Security Council and the threat of economic sanctions as well as diplomatic repercussions.123
The final rung of this first subsection is “solemn and formal declarations”, which came in the
form of international condemnation and decisions from the United States and the European
Union to economically sanction the Russian Federation, drop it from the Group of 8, and
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freezing of dialogue between the European Union and Russian Federation on several bilateral
projects.124
In the second subsection of the model, “traditional crises”, rungs four through nine are
also all applied. With “hardening of positions” (rung four), the countries sanctioning the Russian
Federation began to renew the economic sanctions and increase their scope and intensity. This
led to shows of force from both Russia and the West as both began displaying the ability to
inflict damage upon the other with mobilizations of troops and equipment to strategic areas
across Europe (rung five: “show of force”). Inevitably, this led to rung six, “significant
mobilization”, as the Russian Federation began moving thousands of troops to its western
borders and in Kaliningrad, being matched by NATO mobilizations of thousands of troops to the
Baltic states and Eastern Europe. This was being done simultaneously, on the part of Russia, by
conducting political warfare across liberal democracies in the West in attempt to create political
instability of NATO member states (rung seven: “legal harassment”). Rung eight, “harassing acts
of violence”, has been demonstrated several times over with “near misses” in the Black Sea and
Baltic Sea as Russian fighter jets would conduct unsafe maneuvers that nearly led to collisions
with NATO fighter jets and naval vessels in the area. Within this final subgroup of the model,
rung nine (dramatic military confrontations) was reached twice: the shooting down of a Russian
plane over Turkish air space and a fire fight between U.S. Special Forces and Russian led forces
supporting friendly forces in Syria. Thankfully, both of these events were de-escalated and
stopped short of initiating an open conventional war.
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In the third subgroup of the model, “intense crises”, two rungs can be applied to this
conflict: rung 10 (“provocative breaking off of diplomatic relations”) and rung 16 (“nuclear
ultimatums”). With rung 10, the United States has accused the Russian Federation of being in
violation of the INF Treaty for several years before unilaterally announcing, and then formally,
withdrawing from the treaty. The sanctions, mentioned from rung two, may also be applied to
rung 10 as they prohibited American individuals and entities from conducting any type of
business with those on the sanctions list, indicating intent of “containment” and barring the
sanctioned Russians access to American capital. With rung 16, both the United States and the
Russian Federation immediately began testing of nuclear weapons that were prohibited under
stipulations of the INF Treaty. These tests were actions that supported the rhetoric of both
American and Russian leadership warning that their respective states were focused on the
maintenance, modernization, and buildup of their nuclear forces.
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CHAPTER 7: DIPLOMATIC
At the moment, diplomatically, world leaders in the West and the East admit that
relations between the United States and the Russian Federation are worse than at any point
during the Cold War of the 20th Century. At a joint U.S.-Russia summit in Helsinki, Finland,
President Donald Trump stated, “Even during the tensions of the Cold War, when the world
looked much different than it does today, the United States and Russia were able to maintain
a strong dialogue. But our relationship has never been worse than it is now.”125 At that same
summit, President Putin stated that it was apparent to everyone that relations between the United
States and the Russian Federation were currently complicated in a tense atmosphere and that the
only way to address modern problems was to work together, hoping that the United States felt
the same way.126 Similarly, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres also came out
and said that the Cold War was back, but that the current situation was perhaps more dangerous
than previously.127 Clearly, as of 2018, these world leaders are acknowledging the fact that the
United States and the Russian Federation are in a tense climate for international relations.
CONTAINMENT
In February of 1946, Foreign Service Office George Kennan sent the infamous “Long
Telegram” to the Secretary of State, which outlined the philosophy of Containment and curbing
the expansion of Communism.128 A year later, in order to reach the public, Kennan published this
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same philosophy of Containment in Foreign Affairs in an article entitled “The Sources of Soviet
Conduct.”129 While Kennan actually states the word “containment” in his article, he outlined the
idea in his letter to the Secretary of State by suggesting that the U.S. patiently outlast the Soviet
regime, meet Soviet expansion across the world with force and compel the Soviets to backdown,
and look to other countries where the spread of Communism may face resistance. In his article,
Kennan expands on this idea with the word “containment” and specifically states
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union
must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies… In
the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the
Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a
series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of
Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of. 130

While written seven decades ago, there are several things from Kennan’s “Long
Telegram” and philosophy of Containment that remain true of Russia today. Among these ideas
that still hold true are: the idea that government propaganda shapes the Russian understanding of
the outside world, Russian leadership fearing outside governments influencing the population
and threatening stability of their regime, the insecurity of the regime and need to flex toughness
of Russian state, and the Russian state poisoning information and denying their population access
to the truth.
Today, as during Kennan’s days in Moscow, the Kremlin controls the flow of
information to the public. Officially, as outlined in the 1991 Constitution of the Russian
Federation, there is freedom of speech.131 In practice, the Kremlin smears any independent or
foreign media. In violation of Article 29 of the Russian Constitution, the Russian Government
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has ensured that not everyone has been “guaranteed the freedom of ideas and speech” as well as
pushed, “The propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy.”132 In
practice, the Kremlin has ensured that no more than 20% of media be owned by foreign citizens,
or citizens with dual citizenship.133 And while a clear practice of censorship, this law has been
ruled Constitutional by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.134
On the topic of Containment itself, President Vladimir Putin, on two separate occasions,
in 2014 declared that the United States and the West were still actively pushing this policy.135136
That year, President Putin also stated
I would like to add that in the modern world extremism is often used as a geopolitical instrument
to rearrange spheres of influence. We see the tragic consequences of the wave of so-called ‘colour
revolutions’, the turmoil in the countries that have undergone the irresponsible experiments of covert
and sometimes blatant interference in their lives. We take this as a lesson and a warning, and we must do
everything necessary to ensure this never happens in Russia.137

What these statements reveal is that President Putin has revealed, as Kennan said in the
1940’s, his insecurity and fear of both the outside world and the stability of his regime. This
belief that the United States and the West have continued the policy of Containment toward
Russia also reveals opportunism for President Putin.
The reason that this reveals opportunity for President Putin is because 2014 was the year
that relations between the United States and the Russian Federation really took a turn for the
worse. It should not be forgotten that these comments and this rhetoric came in the wake of
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Western reaction to Russian actions in Ukraine, in both seizing territory and fomenting war.
Those, it also must not be forgotten, were in reaction to the seeming color revolution occurring in
Ukraine and the ousting of President Yanukovych. While supporting Ukrainian calls for
transparency in their Democratic Elections and desires for a freer government would have been
logical along Western lines, it was perceived by Russian leadership as an attempt to further
penetrate into the former Soviet Union in order to directly attack Russia itself. The idea of true
democracy at the borders of Russia proper is what truly frightened President Putin. Putin’s
assertion that “this must never happen in Russia” was not in the interest of the Russian people,
but in the interest of his grip on national power.
Following international backlash to his attempts to prevent liberal democracy at the
borders of Russia, President Putin was then able to shape the centuries old argument of the clash
between Russia and the West, an argument that dates back to the 19th Century with Nikolay
Yakovlevich Danilevsky and his “slavophiles and panslavists”, who concluded that “Europe and
Russia were two distinct and mutually hostile ‘historical-cultural types’, civilizations.”138
Following this thinking, it also makes sense that President Putin has laid the groundwork for a
new Cold War in an attempt to eradicate liberal democracy as a threat to his base of power. In
the span of five years, Putin’s attempts to reassert Russia onto the international stage seems to
have been successful. Before the annexation of Crimea, Russia was not a major concern of the
United States, even if it was always a concern to NATO allies. Today, Russia and Russia’s
President Putin are constantly featured in American news and media.
The mentions of Containment may have been surprising but may hold the answer as in how
to effectively counter Russian aggression. Today, as in the 1940’s, there are ample opportunities
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to meet Putin’s Russia across the world. Russian incursions into Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela,
areas where leadership is contested after the people have voiced favoring liberal democracy, have
come into direct opposition with Western support for self-determination. Today, as during the
struggle against Communism, the United States and the West need to continue their presence in
areas where struggles of self-determination in the face of authoritarian rule are occurring. The
advantage today is that the United States is the only military on the planet that has the force
capability to project anywhere there is one of these conflicts or struggles, and the NATO alliance
is larger today than during the Cold War, meaning that the force projections in support of liberal
democracy and self-determination may be larger than then, but also carries a louder voice of
support through diplomatic rhetoric. This can only be done effectively if the West solves its own
identity crisis, which has, in part, been a consequence of Putin’s campaign to reignite the Cold
War.
IDENTITY AND THE WEST IN CRISIS
In the 21st Century and the Post 9/11 World, another challenge, besides a revanchist
Russia, has surfaced: an identity crisis in the international order. In 2014, Robert Kagan wrote,
“an intellectual problem, a question of identity and purpose.”139 In 2017, John Bew wrote, “By
the spring of 2016, as the presidential election cycle was fully under way, the linkage between
the apparent crisis of world order and this national “question of identity and purpose” became
more pronounced.”140 Republican candidate Donald Trump was moving with the campaign
slogans of “America First” and “Make America Great Again” while his opposition, Hillary
Clinton, represented a continuation of policies formed under the Barack Obama
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administration.141 Donald Trump went on to win the Presidency in the 2016 Election, but this has
had several implications for the current conflict.
Since taking office, President Trump has elected to reject the current American led
international order. Thomas Wright wrote, “He is deeply unhappy with America’s military
alliances and feels the United States is overcommitted around the world. He feels that America is
disadvantaged by the global economy. And he is sympathetic to authoritarian strongmen.”142
President Trump seemed to convey just that during his 2019 State of the Union Address. In it, he
proclaimed
For years, the United States was being treated very unfairly by friends of ours, members of NATO. But
now we have secured, over the last couple of years, more than $100 billion of increase in defense spending
from our NATO Allies…I have great respect for President Xi, and we are now working on a new trade deal
with China. But it must include real, structural change to end unfair trade practices, reduce our chronic
trade deficit, and protect American jobs…Much work remains to be done, but my relationship with Kim
Jong Un is a good one. Chairman Kim and I will meet again on February 27th and 28th in Vietnam.143

In the selected text from his State of the Union Address, President Trump has
demonstrated a focus on holding military allies more accountable for their own security by
pushing the “$100 billion increase in defense spending”, as was one of his promises during the
campaign, as well as this disadvantage in the global economy by pushing the idea of a new trade
deal with China that would “end unfair trade practices, reduce our chronic trade deficit, and
protect American jobs.” Like Wright had stated, President Trump also displayed his sympathy
for authoritarian leaders when mentioning both President Xi Jinping and Chairman Kim Jong
Un, leaders of countries with several claims of human rights abuses against their prospective
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regimes, including allegations from the United States.144145 These struggles with foreign policy
seem to plague the administration as well as issues that arise domestically.

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC ORDER
The current state of geopolitical tensions today may also be attributed to President Putin’s
war with the Liberal Democratic Order. In December 2016, Dr. Robert Kagan (of the Brooking
Institute) testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed Russia and China
were the two greatest threats to the existence of the Liberal Democratic Order.146 In 2017
Foreign Relations Committee member Senator Cory Gardner voiced this same stance in a joint
meeting of the House and Senate before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
when discussing the threats of Russian hybrid warfare.147 These stances come from recognizing
the nihilistic rhetoric that President Putin espouses regarding the Liberal Democratic Order itself.
In June of 2019, Putin gave an interview to the Financial Times in which he continued
this rhetoric. Putin specifically stated, “the liberal idea has become obsolete. It has come into
conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population.”148 While this quote
clearly states his position on the issue of the Liberal Democratic Order, it is not the only thing
that Putin has publicly done to demonstrate this. In 2005, Putin famously stated, “we should
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acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the
century.”149 In March 2018, Putin was also asked by a reporter “Which event in the Russian
history would you like to undo?” to which he replied, “The collapse of the Soviet Union.”150
What may be less known is that in 2014, President Putin also publicly stated his view on the
Liberal Democratic Order when he stated, “We see the tragic consequences of the wave of socalled ‘colour revolutions’…We take this as a lesson and a warning, and we must do everything
necessary to ensure this never happens in Russia.”151
With that 2014 quote, from a Russian National Security Council meeting, President Putin
admitted that the greatest threat facing Russia was Democracy and the threats to stability under
Putin’s status quo. It may also serve to be admission of Putin’s greatest fear as this statement was
made the same year that Russia illegally annexed Crimea and began fomenting war in Ukraine.
The actions taken to support separatist movements around the world, conduct information
operations within Liberal Democracies, and financial support for populist candidates/movements
to undermine the stability of Liberal Democratic governments would only serve as further
evidence. This also may be very important as some critics of the idea of a new Cold War use the
argument that the first Cold War was an ideological conflict between Capitalism and Communism,
believing that no such ideological conflict exists today. However, the argument being made here
is that there is indeed an ideological conflict present today, involving open systems and closed
systems: Liberalism and Realism. To clarify the aforementioned statement, the Kremlin under
President Putin is waging war on the Liberal Democratic Order by attacking the confidence in the
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stability of international organizations and systems. By stressing state sovereignty and the strength
of the state, Russia under Putin’s leadership is conducting international affairs under the guise of
realism in which great state power is the most important aspect. In order to protect his position as
the leader of an authoritarian state (a kleptocracy, which will be discussed further in a subsequent
section), Putin has to wage war on the institution that threatens his stability as a ruler, namely in
the idea of honest and open elections.
In 2016, for the New York Times, German Jochen Bittner coined the term “orderism”,
which he described as conservative alternative to the morally chaotic laissez-faires societies of
the West.152 Orderism, Bittner continues, calls out the hypocrisies of liberalism and offers
political stability instead of Democracy, relying on conservative values and the idea of a
centralized power figure (such as the czar) to deliver greatness to the people. Also in 2016,
Serhat S Çubukçuoğlu writes that orderism works in communal societies with long histories and
established traditions, offering a “savior” who “promises only what he can deliver.”153 Bittner
and Çubukçuoğlu have also both picked up on the importance of the state to enforce this revival
and opposition to what the state labels moral corruption of the liberal democratic societies. This
comes in the form of a strong state security apparatus for physical protection and, at times,
repression of dissidence to the system while the Russian Orthodox Church has re-emerged as a
power, having been attacked by the Soviet system of state atheism.
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In 2017, Marcus Papadopoulos wrote that the Russian Orthodox Church was benefitting
from an alliance with the Kremlin dating back to the establishment of the Russian Federation.154
Through the use of this alliance, the Church has become one of the largest land owners in the
Russian Federation, built and reclaimed thousands of Churches, and hired in excess of 10,000
new clergymen, having them placed in either the new churches or even the Military. In
exchange, the Church directly influences Russian society to reject foreign influences while
promoting Russian patriotism, nationalism, and pushes for the independence and sovereignty of
the Russian state.155 Gregory Freeze, for the Carnegie Endowment Center, wrote later in 2017
that the Church has had to contend with a large society of Russian Orthodox Christians who
belong to no parishes, having to depend on educating and exhorting the public through the
release of academic papers and opinion pieces to be read by the general public.156 While the
expansion of the Church has worked to revive societal control over the Russian people in the
absence of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, it has also led to backlash from secularists and
has perhaps worked to further the divide between the “two-Russias”.
In 2012, Mikhail Dmitriev and Daniel Treisman wrote for Foreign Affairs that there were
two Russias: the first made up of sprawling metropolises and the other being the rest of the
country, lagging behind the cities.157 The majority of Russians, they argue, are nonideological
and are only concerned with local problems and social welfare. However, this was before the
events in Ukraine and Putin’s push for expanding the importance of Russia on the global stage.
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Whether or not this remains true of Russian society is something that must be researched once
more. Yet Dmitriev and Treisman also point out the 2012 protests regarding Putin running for
President once more. This idea of political protests in Russia seems to have resurfaced and has
been constantly oppressed by Russian security services.158 These crackdowns represent the
physical arm of orderism in Russia.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the KGB (the state intelligence service) broke up
into subsequent agencies: the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service
(SVR) and the Central Intelligence Service Committee for State Border Guard. The FSB has
emerged as the most powerful successor to the KGB and has become the most loyal service to
President Putin, having been the director of the FSB before rising to the Presidency. Part of the
power of the FSB has not only been its control of state information in the form of intelligence
officers, but its expansion of influence across the Russian government and Russian businesses. In
2006, Olga Kryshtanovskaya, director of the Moscow-based Center for the Study of Elites,
stated, “If in the Soviet period and the first post-Soviet period, the KGB and FSB [people] were
mainly involved in security issues, now half are still involved in security but the other half are
involved in business, political parties, NGOs, regional governments, even culture… they started
to use all political institutions.”159 According to Kryshtanovskaya, 78% of 1,016 leading Russian
political figures (up to the date of the 2006 article) were former members of the KGB or its
successor agencies. In 2015, the private Intelligence company Stratfor, wrote on the appointment
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of three new former FSB officials, seeming to continue Kryshtanovskaya’s 2006 observations of
intelligence officers rising to government positions.160 A year later, reports surfaced that
President Putin was planning to merge the FSB and SVR into the “Ministry of State Security”
(just as in the Stalinist era) and revive the KGB in all but name.161
Under the idea of orderism in Russia, only dissent of Western liberalism is allowed. This
is because Putin’s Russia is controlling society and working to control the thought of the Russian
people. Through its alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Putin regime is able to exert
uncontested influence through God’s messengers to reinforce his rule. Simultaneously, Putin’s
rule is absolute as the entirety of the Russian government is either directly or indirectly ruled by
former intelligence officers working with or under Putin during his days with both the KGB and
the FSB. The results have been public oppression of free speech against the Kremlin, media
censorship, and oppression of sexuality as assaults against traditional Russian values.
AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, S.E. ASIA
While Russia has had to face backlash from rivals in the West, it has sought to make up
some of its diplomatic shortfalls since 2014 by renewing focus around the world with countries
in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have offered the
greatest footholds for increased Russian influence within Latin America. In Africa, the Central
African Republic, Libya, and Sudan have been the targets of the Russian Federation and its
campaign of influence. In Southeast Asia, Russian influence is less active, but may threaten to
increase as the Russian Federation recognizes that this area is the main area of conflict in the
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contest between the United States and China, yet it may also provide Russia further economic
agreements as there are several strong economies within the region.
Regarding Latin America, President Putin set out on a tour to renew Russia’s
commitments to its bilateral relations with Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in
July 2014.162 The following year, General John Kelly (U.S. Southern Command) gave his force
posture statement to Congress and stated
“Periodically since 2008, Russia has pursued an increased presence in Latin America through propaganda,
military arms and equipment sales, counterdrug agreements, and trade. Under President Putin, however, we
have seen a clear return to Cold War tactics as part of its global strategy. Russia is using power projection
in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and challenge U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. Last year
and again this year, a Russian intelligence ship docked in Havana multiple times while conducting
operations in the Gulf of Mexico and along the east coast of the United States. Russia has courted Cuba,
Venezuela, and Nicaragua to gain access to air bases and ports for resupply of Russian naval assets and
strategic bombers operating in the Western Hemisphere.”163

Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela’s partnership with Russia has allowed it access to their
military facilities, infrastructure projects, and capital that may be used in the long campaign
against the West while also allowing it access to launch operations against American military
and intelligence targets, should Russia so choose.164 In 2019, this position became threatened
with civil upheaval in Venezuela, to which Russia responded by sending in 100 official military
personnel.165 However, a particular concern was that Russia military contractors went in at this
same time in case the regime in power were to fall.166 These contractors are members of the
Wagner group, the same company present in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. This also led for
calls from Erik Prince, founder of American PMC Blackwater, to call for the United States to
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send its own private army of military contractors.167 Yet, if PMCs from both the United States
and Russia met in Venezuela, it would spark a civil war similar to that in Syria today and Angola
during the Cold War.
Just as in Latin America, the Wagner group is being used to push and increase Russian
influence into Africa. General Thomas D. Waldhauser, Commander of U.S. Africa Command,
declared in his force posture statement to Congress
Russia is also a growing challenge and has taken a more militaristic approach in Africa. By employing
oligarch-funded, quasi-mercenary military advisors, particularly in countries where leaders seek
unchallenged autocratic rule, Russian interests gain access to natural resources on favorable terms. Some
African leaders readily embrace this type of support and use it to consolidate their power and authority.
This is occurring in the Central African Republic where elected leaders mortgage mineral rights—for a
fraction of their worth—to secure Russian weapons. Russia also garners additional support at the United
Nations and gains more customers for its military arms sales.168

In August 2019, investigate reporters for CNN followed up with General Waldhauser’s
statement with their own report. These journalists were able to interview one of these Wagner
mercenaries, who stated, “Russia is returning to Africa…We were present in many countries
during the time of the Soviet Union, and Russia is coming back to the same position. We still
have connections and we are trying to re-establish them.”169 The report also gave several
graphics, including an interactive map of Africa where Russia is pressing its presence. Each of
the countries shown have natural resources, minerals, and violent conflict in common. By using
the Wagner group and others from Russian oligarchs, the Russian government is able to take
advantage of the natural resources while giving the impression that it cares more about African
nations than other Western nations.
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This may also be the reason that the Trump administration pushed for a new Africa
Strategy in December 2018.170 The same day, National Security Advisor John Bolton stated that
advancing U.S. commercial ties with African nations, defeating terrorist organizations on the
continent, and ensuring that U.S. tax payer money sent to foreign aid was properly used for its
designated purpose.171 In that same speech, Bolton referenced Russia’s presence in Africa six
times, stating, “In short, the predatory practices pursued by China and Russia stunt economic
growth in Africa; threaten the financial independence of African nations; inhibit opportunities for
U.S. investment; interfere with U.S. military operations; and pose a significant threat to U.S.
national security interests.”172 What this may mean for Africa is returning to its position as being
used in a global chess match between the United States and the Russian Federation (along with
Russia’s partner in China) that it held in the Twentieth Century while benefiting from economic
investment in infrastructure and resource extraction. The foreign investments may also be used to
leverage weapons from both the United States and the Russian Federation who already compete
as the world’s two largest arms exporters on the international stage.
In April 2019, PhD candidate Tomasz Burdzik wrote in Russian International Affairs
Council (Russia’s leading foreign affairs journal), that Russia is not currently significant in the
Indo-Pacific region, but that it was focusing on increasing its presence and becoming significant,
acting as a counter-balance for countries who are currently stuck between China and the United
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States.173 Russia’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia was also noted by Admiral Harry B.
Harris, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command. In his 2018 force posture statement before the
House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Harris called Russia one of the five greatest threats
to Pacific Command and the region.174 Admiral Harris also told Congress, “Moscow seeks to
alleviate some of the effects of sanctions imposed following their aggression in Ukraine by
diplomatically wooing select states in Asia.” Admiral Harris followed that statement by stating
that, “Russia also sees economic opportunities to not only build markets for energy exports, but
also to build – or in some cases rebuild – arms sales relationships in the region.”
A year later, Admiral Harris’ successor, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, also stated that he
viewed Russia as one of the five biggest threats to the region.175 While Admiral Harris mentioned
the diplomatic and economic efforts Russia was making in the region, Admiral Davidson was
focused on the military, which included Russia reinforcing its Eastern military district as well as
its Pacific fleet. Beyond mere military actions, President Putin demonstrated Russia’s interest in
the region by attending the 13th East Asia Summit (EAS) for the first time since Russia joined in
2010.176 Russia, like the United States and China, is a dialogue partner within the 18-member state
summit. While in Singapore for the EAS, President Putin also put out a joint statement with
ASEAN members regarding the 3rd ASEAN-Russian Federation Summit on Strategic Partnership,
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whereby both Russia and the countries of Southeast Asia declared their intents on further
increasing trade and diplomatic relations.177
FORMER USSR COUNTRIES AND ZONE OF INFLUENCE
In the years following the fall of the Soviet Union, former Soviet member states and
members of the Warsaw Pact have joined the EU and NATO. These countries have been some of
Moscow’s most outspoken critics, but also the most apprehensive regarding a possible invasion
of their territories similar to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, as well as the fomentation of war in
other parts of Ukraine. The states of Eastern Europe (with the exceptions of Belarus and Serbia)
have stood firmly against Russian aggression and Russia’s resurgent aspirations. This has come
in the form of voting for sanctions, requesting increased NATO forces on their territory, and
hosting components of the U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Shield in Romania and Poland.
Following World War II, the Soviet Union used these countries as a buffer zone to protect
Russia from a Western invasion. Today, these countries are important to Russia as many of the
militaries still rely on Russian small arms, but also as markets for Russian oil and energy. At the
moment, Russia is the largest supplier of energy to the EU, but it depends on oil pipelines to flow
to the West through Eastern Europe. At the same time, the NATO and EU member states in the
region are being held hostage by that same fact as they are dependent on that same energy.
Additionally, border disputes over recent years have led to visa requirements and begun to make
crossing the border into Russia from the West (and vice versa) more difficult. Russia also considers
this area its “backyard”, the most strategically important territory for its ambitions, and is lashing
out that these states have turned West. Ukraine was meant as a message and deterrent for more of
these states: don’t think of turning away from Moscow.
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CHAPTER 8: INFORMATIONAL
REFLEXIVE CONTROL
As a part of their information war, Russian intelligence and security services have
practiced reflexive control since the days of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or
KGB. In 1986, Diane Chotikul published a psychocultural study on the Soviet theory of
Reflexive Control for the Naval Post Graduate School in California. Chotikul noted that an
important aspect of reflexive control relied on the applications of lozh and vranyo.178 Chotikul
describes lozh as “actual lies and total untruths” while describing vranyo as “more subtle term
referring to the dissemination of untruths which have some grounding in reality.” She also
describes vranyo as a more clandestine strategy of implementing reflexive control, as the idea is
to spread misinformation, while lozh is described as purely disinformation. Both of these terms
have been demonstrated within Russia’s influence operations in the United States and the
European Union through the use of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), also known as Russia’s
Troll Factory, as well as other resources of state propaganda.
The strategy for operatives of the IRA was to work in groups to fabricate social media
activity regarding sensitive topics. These operatives would employ both lozh and vranyo when
working to further polarize target populations. In the United States, the target was to further
divide Americans along partisan lines, both “Republican” and “Democrat”, by using historical
issues of race and racial division. Facebook acknowledged that the most common topic was the
“Black Lives Matter” movement, which erupted in reaction to the deaths of Black Americans by
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local law enforcement agencies across the country. This not only demonstrated with the IRA, but
also by RT in their coverage of events in the United States.
Russian propaganda efforts were able to deploy vranyo in reaction to the riots in
Ferguson, Missouri. Regarding the riots in Ferguson (which prompted the beginnings of the
“Black Lives Matter” movement), American news companies focused on the actual protests. Fox
News reported in 2014 that people were peacefully protesting in large numbers, sparking similar
protests across the country, which would also lead to riots in some of those cities.179 CNN
reported similar findings, but also the presence of some rioters, interviewing concerned citizens
worried about the riots and what this would mean for the future of their community.180 RT, on the
other hand, published several stories that sought to continue a divisive agenda. In one article, at
the same time as American coverage, the article was entitled, “Arrests, protests & 'Xmas carols':
Ferguson unrest enters fifth day, c15 detained”, with an image of a white Missouri National
Guardsmen arresting a black protestor.181 In a subsequent article, the headline was “Terror on
American soil': #FergusonOctober stages 4-day rally as shooting anger rages.”182 A year later,
RT decided to publish another article related to the protests entitled, “Heavily-armed white men
patrol Ferguson, ‘ready to confront authorities to defend US Constitution’” depicting seemingly
White Nationalists patrolling the area, and continuing to work on racially sensitive issues to keep
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pushing an image of a racist America.183 RT has done this same dissemination of misinformation
in other areas as well, including the topic of U.S. government surveillance.
In 2013, former government contractor Edward Snowden leaked sensitive information
regarding U.S. surveillance programs.184 At the time, it was big news in the United States and the
Western world because of its mention of surveillance on American citizens. Since then, Western
coverage has focused on these programs and their successful surveillance of foreign targets (as
were intended by design). In 2017, CNN reported that the National Security Agency (NSA) was
surveilling over 100,000 foreign nationals.185 In 2019, Fox News published an article that U.S.
Senators were concerned about the risk of foreign spying on Americans and an additional article
(the day before) detailing risks of Chinese cyber espionage on Americans.186 In the same period
(since 2017), RT coverage of U.S. government surveillance has been focused solely on
surveillance of American citizens (something that Western news outlets had not focused on since
the Snowden leaks in 2013). An RT article in 2018, stated that NSA spying of American citizens
had increased to over 530 million electronic communications in 2017.187 In 2019, RT published
an article claiming that a Department of Homeland Security official had leaked that the U.S.
government was spying on, and tracking, journalists covering the migrant caravans at the
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southern border.188 This story was also reported on by the New York Times, but there was very
little other coverage to substantiate the claims from RT than the one story from the New York
Times.189
Here the use of vranyo is demonstrated by taking the reality that the U.S. government has
a recent history of spying on American citizens and continuing to run with the story to influence
the target audience that this is still the reality. This is also evident with the story of “spying on
journalists” as the New York Times article came out a week before the RT article was published,
lending some time to establish credibility for the story. This strategy was also evident in the
stories regarding the riots in Ferguson, Missouri. There, RT was reporting on a live event, but the
focus on the American history of racial divisions and issues allowed RT to continue invoking
these memories and work to bring them back to the forefront of American consciousness, also
working to effectively set the stage for a new era of racial struggle between American citizens
not seen since the Civil Rights movement. Yet the Russian use of IRA operatives was just as
effective at stirring these emotions, and arguably much faster than through the use of traditional
media like RT.
By working in these groups, the IRA operatives could create fake accounts posing as
activists and calling for violence against opposing parties. These operations were meant to be
conducted 24 hours a day by requiring operatives to work 12 hour shifts and then swap out with
their replacements at the end of their shift. Facebook also acknowledged that another sensitive
topic was the existence of multiple secessionist movements that began springing up during the
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Obama administration. Particularly, these operatives focused on the Texas and California
secessionist movements.
It is likely that they targeted these movements in reaction to the 2012 establishment of a
White House program that allowed for citizens to draft and sign petitions. Texas was one of
many states that drafted a petition for secession, but the White House rejected this (as well as all
other calls) for secession these states.190 It is also possible that these agents would have targeted
the Texas secession movement for, if having conducted research, they would have discovered
that Texas is the only state to join the United States via Treaty, not annexation, and maintained
the right to leave the Union. Yet, supporting secessionist movements hasn’t been limited to the
United States. The U.S. Senate found that Russia was doing the same thing in Spain, supporting
the Catalan secessionist movement as well.191
Spain is only one example of these attempts at undermining the cohesiveness of member
nations within the EU. Another contentious example was Russia’s attempt to influence the
outcome of the UK’s decision on whether to remain or leave the EU, famously dubbed “Brexit”.
The report that U.S. Senate released that indicated that Russia was sponsoring the Catalan
secessionist movement also indicates that Russia was instrumental in influencing British voters
before the Brexit vote in June 2016.192 The information indicates use of lozh by Russian IRA
agents, creating “bots” (computer programs of fake social media accounts” to spread
disinformation, misinformation, and flat out lies to the British public on the morning of the vote.
The report also indicates that traditional media outlets, like RT, were using vranyo to inflame
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fears of migration into the UK around the time of voting, rooted in the recent migration crisis
that was affecting the rest of the EU. The report also acknowledges that the British government
and British people have effectively countered propaganda efforts by airing legislative sessions
(similar to U.S. broadcasts of C-SPAN), but that, during this Russian attempt, seemed to have
failed.
Russia attempted to do the same in France and Germany during Presidential and
Parliamentary elections. Russian efforts in France succeeded in sponsoring a candidate who
made it to the final round of the Presidential elections, but ultimately failed as candidate
Emanuel Macron won the presidency instead of Marine Le Pen, who the Russian government
had been sponsoring (physically through financial contributions and through influence with
media coverage). In Germany, these Russian efforts were able to get the Alternative for Germany
(AfD) party elected to the Parliament: the first Far Right party to enter the Parliament since the
National Socialists of the 1930’s and 1940’s.
Chotikul moves beyond lozh and vranyo by discussing maskirovska, which she describes as
camouflage, concealment, and deception in efforts to “warp the enemy's view of their combat
missions.”193 Chotikul describes the application of maskirovska as intended for psychological
operations against adversarial military units. Yet, it would appear that, in the three decades since
Chotikul’s paper, the Russian government has decided to evolve maskirovska to use the traditional
strategies of control (lozh and vranyo) to warp the perception of target populations in order to
accomplish national objectives in a global information war.
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TRANSPARENCY AND PUTIN
One option that should also be considered is to delegitimize President Putin in the face of
his people. This can be done by being transparent and releasing evidence of Mr. Putin’s alleged
criminal activities, which date back to the 1990’s. In 2012, the Wilson Center released an article
regarding renowned Kreminologist Karen Dawisha and her research into Mr. Putin’s illicit
activities.194 The article detailed how Vladimir Putin used his position as Mayor of St. Petersburg
to launder money, move money, and signed unauthorized contracts for the movement of money
in and out of Russia in the early 1990’s, while Russia was suffering an economic depression in
reaction to the fall of the Soviet Union and shock therapy. The article also mentions that the St.
Petersburg City Council hired an American private firm to investigate the allegations into this
conduct, with their legislative reaction and decision also published.195
In 2014, Dawisha released Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? which includes three
chapters dedicated to the rise of Russia’s oligarchs, Mr. Putin’s time in St. Petersburg, and his
alleged crimes.196 In 1991 the KGB took control of large sums of Soviet money following a
failed coup attempt and led to the establishment of the oligarchs, using that money to buy former
state assets.197 Dawisha argues that there is no Russian state, only the “Kremlin Inc.” with the
Russian Duma (the Parliament) working as an extension of the President that Mr. Putin can
consolidate power by using the media, the security services, and the law to punish disloyalty and
secure control over illicit financial accounts.198 Dawisha continues her account of Mr. Putin’s
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activities by mentioning that the current Russian government operates through people who were
connected to him during his days as the mayor of St. Petersburg, that he was the “ultimate
arbiter” among Russian economic elites and that his decision was final.199 She also details that
her research is rooted in study of extensive international criminal investigations into Mr. Putin
and interviews with former diplomats from countries detailing extensive travel where Mr. Putin
had the opportunity to meet with international organized crime syndicates.200 Like Dawisha, the
U.S. Senate report on Russian influence operations abroad mentions a list of Mr. Putin’s
organized criminal activities, mentioning the word “criminal” three times in the Executive
Summary alone.201 The evidence of the accusations of Mr. Putin’s criminal conduct extend to his
tenure as a leading figure, and including President, of the Russian Federation.
One of the most serious crimes levied against President Putin is from his time as Prime
Minister of Russia (the first time) when Russia experienced a series of apartment bombings. The
U.S. Senate report details that FSB agents, under orders from Putin, bombed apartment buildings
in Dagestan, Moscow, Volgodonsk, and Ryazan (the Ryazan bombing was stopped before the
explosives could be detonated) in order to provide justification for starting the Second Chechen
War by blaming the acts on Chechen terrorists.202 For FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko, who
defected to the United Kingdom, also published a book in 2002 entitled Blowing Up Russia: Terror
from Within, concluding that Vladimir Putin ordered the bombing of Russian citizens to start that
military conflict.
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COUNTERPROPAGANDA AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGE NEWS BROADCASTING
In 2012, Mikhail Dmitriev and Daniel Treisman published an article in Foreign Affairs
entitled “The Other Russia: Discontent Grows in the Hinterlands”.203 They argued that, within
Russia, there existed two societies: the educated society (the minority) and the ignorant (the
majority, primarily in the vast provinces of Russia).204 Similarly, in 2014, Ilya Matveev suggests
that this is an old theory that has been gaining ground since the 2012 Russian Presidential
Election.205 Following this idea, here is the problem: reaching the majority population which is
only fed state propaganda and state news.
Knowing that the Kremlin propaganda machine is able to reach Russian speaking
Americans, the United States decided to fight back by sponsoring a Russian language news
operation of its own: Current Time (CT). CT is a 24-hour news operation that works to fight the
Kremlin’s propaganda machine by offering Russian language news from Washington D.C. that
offers a different view than that being pushed by the Kremlin and RT. It offers Russian speakers
access to news that has not been pushed by the Russian state in an attempt to sever the strong
connection between Russian expats and traditional Russian news organizations, which have
fallen victim to the Kremlin’s tightening control on mass media.206
Having the power of funding a Russian language speaking news station, hosted by
Russian ex-pats, the United States has realized one of its own weaknesses: the language barrier.
During the first Cold War, the "United States Informational and Educational Exchange Act of
1948" intended for certain materials and information to only be disseminated to foreign
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audiences (white propaganda).207 In 2013, for Foreign Policy, John Hudson wrote an article
detailing how the 2012 Amended Smith-Mundt Act effectively repealed the prohibitions of the
U.S. Government to disseminate materials to U.S. citizens that were solely intended for foreign
audiences.208 The specific text of the 2012 Act states that the purpose of the bill was, “to
authorize the domestic dissemination of information and material about the United States
intended primarily for foreign audiences, and for other purposes.”209 Having granted authority
for dissemination of white propaganda, the State Department or other agencies of the Federal
government can use the legitimacy model of propaganda to feed stories to Current Time in order
to push alternative narratives to what is being pushed from the Kremlin.
Moreover, the United States government can identify Russian ex-pats or other academics
from within “the minority” group to “own” operations of Central Time within the Russian
Federation. What becomes difficult is the Russian restriction on foreign media ownership. The
United States would need to identify Russian citizens who have become disillusioned with the
Russian government in order to host the streaming of Central Time within Russia. In other words,
the United States should seek to reciprocate Russia’s actions of broadcasting RT in the United
States by broadcasting CT in Russia. It should also look to provide funding for CT to be broadcast
amongst the different provinces of the Russian Federation, reaching the majority population which
may only, at this time, be able to access state run news agencies like Channel 1. One way to do
this would be to target the regions of the Caucasus where there is less support for the Federal
government as a whole, as well as other fringe republics that are at odds with the Federal
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government frequently. Additionally, besides broadcasting of geopolitical news, a CT broadcast
within the Russian Federation can offer news of Sports teams in the West as sports were
demonstrated to be vitally important in the “culture war” during the first Cold War.
HOLLYWOOD MOVIES
Another powerful tool that the United States has at its disposal is the cinematic power of
Hollywood in Los Angeles, California. In 2018, The Motion Pictures Association of America
reported that the U.S. film industry contributed $134 billion to the U.S. economy by exporting
four times more material than was being imported by U.S. audiences.210 With the power and
outreach that Hollywood has to reach audiences, there is an opportunity to shape narratives to
reach these audiences. It would also not be the first time that the U.S. government would have
utilized this asset, as it used Hollywood for a deception operation in 1980 to exfiltrate American
Embassy workers from Iran.211 Again, using the authority of the 2012 Amended Smith-Mundt
Act, and basing this strategy on a legitimizing propaganda model, cinema focusing on Russia and
delegitimizing the Putin regime would be possible.
During the first Cold War of the 20th Century, there were dozens of films produced that
detailed the struggle between the Capitalists and the Communists, the United States and the
Soviet Union.212 Since the present conflict began in 2014, there seems to have been a resurgence
in movies depicting struggles between the United States and the Russian Federation. The 2018
film Creed II seeks to be a decades in the coming sequel to the 1985 film Rocky IV, which pitted
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super athletes Rocky Balboa and Ivan Drago, from the West and the East respectively, against
one another in a class of cultures. The 2018 sequel brings this clash back to life 30 years after,
following the children of two of the protagonists from the first film.213 One issue that could arise
from movies that follow a strategy of “us versus them”, or United States versus Russia, would be
to add fuel to President Putin’s argument that this is how the West sees it: the West versus
Russia, which allows President Putin to continue using a victim card for the Russian people.
The wiser alternative would be to promote fictional stories of U.S. assistance to the
Russian people in the wake of oppressive regimes. In 2018, there were two instances of this: Red
Sparrow and Hunter Killer. Red Sparrow is a fictional tale of a Russian intelligence operative
who faces abuse and oppression from her government, going on to work with an American CIA
operative that she ends up falling in love with, and her superior officer, providing intelligence to
the United States in a coordinated effort to undermine the Russian regime.214 Hunter Killer is a
story of a U.S. naval commander and his submarine crew working to save the Russian President
from a coup and attempt at igniting a war between the two countries.215 These types of stories
work to undermine a narrative that it is “us against them”, but would, rather, reinforce a narrative
of cooperation and assistance based on moral high ground and combating a regime that is no
stranger to human rights abuses. These types of stories can also work to subconsciously promote
American ideals abroad as well as ideals of cooperation between the United States and the
Russian people that is not possible with such regimes in power. Hollywood has the power and
reach to produce such films and project them to the former Soviet Union and Russia proper.
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With the power of streaming services in the 21st Century, it might also be wise for these
projects to be done with companies like Netflix, who has 250 million subscribers worldwide.216
The additional power of Netflix as a streaming powerhouse of Hollywood films and original
content is that its content varies from country to country. That being said, if an agreement between
Netflix and the U.S. government pushing for some of the Russian related works of fiction is that
they would be able to broadcast these films in target areas to continue to subconsciously turn
populations against the Russian government.
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CHAPTER 9: MILITARY
RETURN TO STATE ON STATE WARFARE
Under the Trump administration, the United States has recognized the reemerging threat
from nation states looking to challenge the state of bipolarity that has been in place since the fall
of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the administration’s first National Security Strategy, the first
threat listed states, “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests,
attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies
less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their
societies and expand their influence.”217 This comes in response to the 2015 Russian National
Security Strategy that strongly advocates what it calls a “polycentric world”, or pushing for its
place in reshaping the unipolar world into a multipolar world.218 Writing for the Washington
Post, Andy Akin notes that the 2015 Russian National Security Strategy is focusing on “creating
a new, more favorable balance of power in the international system; broadening access to new
markets for funding and exports; and actively exerting influence in the former Soviet region.”219
This marks a change in the perception of threats that has been present throughout the
Twenty First Century thus far. In his 2002 National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush
wrote, “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger
America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores
for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies
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and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.”220 This indicates that the focus of the
first administration in the Twenty First Century was on terrorism and asymmetrical threats as
opposed to traditional adversaries, such as state actors. President Bush’s administration continued
this focus on terrorism and asymmetrical threats in his next National Security Strategy, released in
2006.221 When Barack Obama became President, he also decided to focus on terrorism and the
threats emanating from Al-Qaeda.222 In 2015, with his second National Security Strategy,
President Obama and his administration did acknowledge the rising threat of Russia, but focus was
still centered on defeating terrorism while simultaneously reinforcing existing alliances and
moving towards the Asia-Pacific region.223 The seeds had begun to be planted, but it was not until
the later stages of the Obama administration, and now the Trump administration, that serious focus
on returning to a state of contention with state actors was considered.
FORCE SIZE INCREASE AND INTEGRATION
Military buildup and modernization has been a top Russian priority since the presidency of
Dmitry Medvedev. In this promise, President Medvedev declared Russia’s intent to modernize
its nuclear arsenal, buildup its force strength, and modernize all aspects of its military. In 2016,
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published a comprehensive work on the state of Russia’s
military power. This DIA report found that the Russian military was attempting to abandon the
Soviet Cold-War style force and, “a massive state armaments program was initiated, allocating
1.1 trillion rubles over 10 years, aiming at fielding a Russian military with 70% new or

220

National Security Strategy Archive, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” published
2002, available at: http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf.
221 National Security Strategy Archive, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” published
2006, available at: http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf.
222 National Security Strategy Archive, “The National Security Strategy,” published 2010, available at:
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf.
223 National Security Strategy Archive, “The National Security Strategy,” published 2015, available at:
http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.

71

modernized equipment by 2020.”224 According to the DIA report, the Russian military numbers
Over the course of this program, the Russian Federation has started to trim down to one million
servicemen, 900,000 personnel, and demonstrated the ability to mobilize over 300,000 at one
time for official military exercises.225 With increases in military exercises across the Russian
Federation, observers have seen the creation of new divisions, worth as much as 80,000
personnel, particularly in the Western half of the country. The United States has seen fit to begin
matching the Russian force increase under Donald Trump.
As a candidate, Donald Trump criticized the state of the military under the Obama
administration (which was at odds with the leadership that he would eventually inherit).226
Within two months of his inauguration, Donald Trump and his administration published a fact
sheet indicating that increasing the size of the military, its budget, and effectiveness were a top
administration priority.227 For the administration’s first National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), which funds the military for the fiscal year, Congress authorized the appropriation of
$695.9 billion, an $84.7 billion increase from the $611.2 billion under the 2017 NDAA in
President Obama’s final year of office.228 The 2018 NDAA (President Trump’s first) authorized
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a force size of 1,322,500 active and 823300 reserve personnel.229 The 2019 NDAA authorized
the addition of 15,600 active and 800 reserve personnel from the previous year for totals of
1,338,100 active and 824,100 reserve personnel.230 The 2020 NDAA is seeking to increase active
personnel to 1,339,500, an increase of 1,400 personnel but offers no additional numbers for
reserves.231
Beyond mere troop sizes, the Russian Federation has also begun to reshape their doctrine of
war, more akin to that of the United States. What is being called Russian hybrid warfare is
actually an integration of various DIME instruments simultaneously and may be attributed to
Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov’s observations of the events in the Middle
East while the United States has been active in fighting the War on Terror. This is because
Russian hybrid warfare is asymmetric in nature, (and is equivalent to covert black operations),
and specifically blend regular and irregular components and units to blur the lines of how a unit
operates.232 Using 2001 to 2013 as a time frame, one can assume that the Russian military was
studying U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal, the pioneer of the U.S. Special Operations
Forces (SOF) war machine in the war on terror.
McChrystal’s understanding of the situation in Iraq and use of SOF in Iraq turned 2004’s
record of 18 specialized night raids against insurgents into 300 per month by August 2006.233
McChrystal also acknowledges that part of what he and his subordinates did was learn from the
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situation, increase communications across a wider geographic network, and utilize intelligence to
begin eliminating countless insurgent targets each and every night. Alexander Salt writes that
McChrystal’s approach was network-centric and allowed for retention of traditional capabilities
with professionalism, technology, and overwhelming force when needed in order to successfully
conduct swift and precise operations.234 Salt also writes that McChrystal’s reforms were able, “to
create a quasi-flattened command hierarchy for JSOC, which would allow for maximum
organizational efficiency by attempting to streamline information gathering, analysis, and
distribution.’”235
McChrystal’s revolution in the way that SOF were able to swiftly and asymmetrically
overpower targets was an example for other major conventional militaries to admire and adopt.
The operation to swiftly take over the Crimean Peninsula is an example of other militaries
following this lead. Following the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Operations doctrine
definition of the capabilities of SOF, these capabilities can be attributed to this operation.
Specifically, the capabilities listed are:
(1) Conduct operations with CF, multinational partners, and IGOs. (2) Work closely with foreign military
and civilian authorities and populations, when directed. (3) Deploy rapidly and provide tailored responses.
(4) Gain access to hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive areas to prepare the
operational environment for future operations and develop options for addressing potential national
concerns. (5) Conduct operations in austere environments with limited support and a low-profile. (6)
Communicate worldwide using organic equipment. (7) Assess local situations and report rapidly. (8)
Execute special operations missions using nonstandard equipment. 236

In Crimea, the Russian SOF were able to deploy rapidly, gain access to the territory and
prepare it for a future military operation, conduct their operation without any support, and
execute their mission without any standard equipment. The speed was demonstrated when
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President Putin admitted that these SOF were able to take over the parliament of Crimea four
days following his decision to retake the peninsula.237 This also paved the way for the Russian
military to deploy 100,000 personnel so that the territory could not be retaken.238 They also
demonstrated the ability to conduct the operation without any support or standard equipment as
they were in unmarked uniforms and lightly armed.239 The application of McChrystal’s
revolution in SOF was also being used by the Russians elsewhere around the world, such as in
Syria and Venezuela.
The Special Operations doctrine also discusses the SOF role in conducting irregular
warfare and unconventional warfare. The doctrine specifically defines irregular warfare as, “a
violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant
population(s).” It also states that the goal is to, “create instability and disrupt and negate state
legitimacy and governance to gain and maintain control or influence over and the support of a
relevant population.”240 According to the doctrine, this is paired with unconventional warfare to,
“support an insurgency, or resistance movement against a nation state,” in a hostile nation
(Ukraine) and “support a nation state against an insurgency, resistance, or terrorists” (Syria and
Venezuela). The Russian SOF have been supporting the nation states of Syria and Venezuela
against resistance movements and an insurgency.241 The Russians have also accomplished this by
the use of military contractors.242 The specific military contracting company, the Wagner Group,
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emerged when they were engaged by U.S. SOF in Syria and suffered 200 casualties.243 It was
this same group that deployed to Venezuela in January of 2019 to shore up the security of
President Nicolas Maduro as it seemed that his rule was in danger and a civil war would break
out.244
The relevancy of the Russian SOF and their adoptions of American military doctrine would
have wide implications for the security of Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine. These three countries
have shown a dependence on the United States and NATO allies for their protection, but they have
also shown a keen interest on the idea of guerilla forces and fighting an invasion via asymmetric
means. The Russian experience has shown that, even having adopted the American doctrine, they
cannot fully employ the tactics to an American level when fighting American forces. The 200
casualties in Syria display that. The casualties in Syria did something else, it showed that if you
are willing to contact and destroy these Russian SOF conducting hybrid warfare operations, then
you can stop the further progression and advance of their campaign.245 In this regard, these three
countries have the advantage as the United States has military personnel and SOF in each of these
countries, preparing local forces in the event of such an invasion.246
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Under President Putin, Russia has declared plans for its nuclear arsenal through 2027,
currently at an estimated $10.8 billion a year (SIPRI estimate for 2016).247 Russia’s declaration of
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building and modernizing its nuclear arsenal has also led to an American response to do the same.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, released by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, states that the
United States has been determined to reduce its nuclear arsenal since the 1990s, but that Russia
has not. This report was in response to a 2017 memorandum from President Donald Trump
requesting a review of U.S. nuclear capabilities and his dedication to modernizing these weapons.
Following the request of the President for a new Nuclear Posture Review, the Congressional
Budget Office released a report in January 2019 that estimated that proposed spending on nuclear
force modernization through 2028 would be $494 billion, or just under $50 billion a year.248 If the
estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are accurate, then the $50 billion U.S. and $10.8 billion
Russian annual investments in nuclear forces would prove former Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev right: the U.S. and Russia are destined for a renewed arms race (2010 Address to the
Federal Assembly).249
CYBER WARFARE
The weaponization of computer viruses and malware in the Twenty-First Century seems
to be one of the most important developments in the conflict today, just as the development of
nuclear weapons was during the Cold War in the Twentieth-Century. This is not because cyber
weapons have the capability of erasing entire cities and nations off the face of the earth, but rather
because they are asymmetrical tools being deployed every day. With nuclear weapons, they were
only ever used against a targeted adversary’s population twice (1945) and then stockpiled. Since
being developed, there have been many recorded uses of cyber weapons. In this thesis, only the
U.S. deployment of Stuxnet and the Russian uses of remote access tools have been specifically
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named, but there is a plethora of other recorded instances of their use. This is because cyber
operations are relatively inexpensive means of attacking an adversary and can range in
sophistication from network traffic flooding (like Russia in Estonia and Georgia) to sophisticated
malware that can shut down entire factories (the U.S. with Stuxnet).
Just as important to the development of cyberweapons and cyber operations has been the
response. To date, there has been no kinetic response to major states in retaliation for a cyber
operation. Thus far, the only recorded evidence of a retaliatory strike for a cyber operation has
been Israel against Hamas in 2019.250 That being said, Hamas is a terrorist organization with
limited conventional capabilities. While it was a “world first”, Iran had the opportunity to do
exactly that in retaliation for the Stuxnet operation, which damaged physical infrastructure, but did
not lead to any casualties or deaths. There may be an argument that attacks on power grids could
lead to casualties and would be cause of a kinetic response, but even then, this would be due to
secondary or tertiary effects, not directly as cyberweapons only disrupt digital signals. The main
challenges that arise are the fact that U.S. KCNI are vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security already warned that
Russia had been attacking energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical
manufacturing networks.251 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security also states that there are
16 KCNI, “whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so
vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination
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thereof.”252 The U.S.-CERT report identifies six of the 16 sectors having been targeted by Russian
cyber actors. This also would indicate that Russian Intelligence Services (most likely the GRU)
are probing vulnerabilities in U.S. KCNI that may be used in the future for a variety of reasons,
whether retaliatory for geopolitical policy moves, or first strike in a covert operation akin to the
2016 Election meddling.
Understanding that both the United States and the Russian Federation have similar cyber
capabilities, one can also assume that the United States has reciprocated the moves and targeted
Russian infrastructure. Perhaps the greatest escalation in a cyber confrontation between the two
powers would be the use of “logic bombs”, or other cyber weapons secretly deployed within the
adversary’s network meant to disrupt and destroy computer networks. At face value, this type of
an attack may seem harmless. That being said, the nightmare scenario is that logic bombs are
deployed in defense networks and power grids, rendering air defense systems useless and working
in tandem with either nuclear or conventional forces to target the enemy. Again, the problem is
that these operations are widely used and that there are currently no international norms or
agreements on conducting this type of warfare against one another. During the Cold War, the
concept of Mutually Assured Destruction kept the nuclear super powers in check. The absence of
such a framework, and the difficulty in attributing attacks, lead to a chaotic system in which one
can expect cyber attacks and operations daily, even hourly as Figure 3.1 shows:
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Figure 3.1: Cyber Threat Map
The above map from Kaspersky shows a live interactive map of cyber incidents happening
around the world.253 At the moment, there are no further policy recommendations regarding U.S.
cyber conduct against Russia as the United States already has dedicated cyber military components
as well as the NSA working both defensive and offensive cyber operations against U.S.
adversaries. However, on the offensive side, these U.S. cyber assets should target Russian critical
infrastructure in the same sectors that have been targeted by sanctions, but also Russia’s reciprocal
SWIFT system, which will be discussed further in the following section. By targeting and attacking
these sectors, it would send the message to the Russian Federation that further attacks on U.S.
infrastructure would be followed with like retaliation, and precision strikes would be meant to
inflict maximum economic damage to critical systems. This would work, as Kennan pointed out,
to make the Russians back down as they would understand the repercussions in such attacks. While
this statement may at first appear to fall victim to the mirror image bias, or even “rational actor”
bias, this thesis has also provided record of Russia backing down when being met with force as
Kennan had suggested in the 1940’s.
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CHAPTER 10: ECONOMIC
LIQUID NATURAL GAS AND ENERGY
The greatest weapon in an economic war against the Russian Federation is energy. With
Russia so heavily dependent on exports of oil and energy, weaponizing oil was able to
destabilize the Russian monetary unit while simultaneously forcing Russia into an economic
recession. This is in allusion to the literature review and the belief that the United States had
Saudi Arabia flood the market. By asking Saudi Arabia to flood the market, the United States
was able to stunt Russian growth while the Saudis were able to strike at Iran.
According to the World Bank, the Russian GDP contracted 3.7 percent during this
recession, or the period from 2014-2017.254 During this same time, the United States overtook
Russia for first place in gas production and second place in oil production.255 Also during this time,
ports for LNG importation began to increase in their utilization. According to the King and
Spalding law firm, there are currently 28 large-scale facilities, 8 small scale facilities, and 22
planned large-scale facilities dedicated to storing LNG and regassifying it for energy purposes.256
What this means is greater diversification for energy in the EU, and less reliance on Russia for oil
needs. In May 2019, the European Commission released a statement, pledging to double EU intake
of U.S. liquefied natural gas over the next five years with the annual total reaching the equivalent
of 8 billion cubic meters in 2023, double the current annual rate of imports.257 European Energy
Commissioner Miguel Arias Canete stated, “Given our heavy dependence on imports, U.S.
liquefied natural gas, if priced competitively, could play an increasing and strategic role in EU gas
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supply.”258 What this signifies is the United States is looking to cut into Russia’s largest energy
market, the European Union, by offering alternatives to Russian oil, which has likewise been
weaponized in the past to punish countries that the Kremlin sees fit.
DOMESTIC ECONOMICS: DEREGULATE AND TAX INCENTIVES
In his 2018 annual news conference, held annually right before Christmas, President
Putin mentioned the economic sanctions from the West and what it has meant for Russia.259
President Putin stated that Russia’s response to the sanctions in 2014 was to push for domestic
output of goods to substitute those that were no longer being imported due to the sanctions and
freezing of tensions with the West. Richard Connolly, professor at the University of Birmingham
in the United Kingdom, published his research that supported Putin’s claims in 2018.260
Specifically, Connolly found that the Kremlin and state apparatus used the sanctions as a
national security threat and used central authority to stabilize the three affected sectors (energy,
defense, and finance) to increase domestic output, use of domestic technologies, and switching
dependencies on foreign capital to markets that were not sanctioning Russia.261 While increasing
domestic output in the affected sectors has helped Russia recover from the sanctions induced
recession, tax incentives were also introduced.
In 2016, following an “economic issues conference”, the Russian government introduced
“special economic zones” as one of the options to assist in economic recovery.262 According to
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the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, these “special economic
zones” are territories that offer special benefits and incentives for investors in the industrial,
technology, logistics and tourism sectors.263 These were the same zones that President Putin
mentioned in his joint press conference with President Xi Jinping in 2018.264 During this same
period, there have been calls in the United States for something similar.
In 2011, American news outlet ABC issued a “Made in America” challenge to its viewing
audience.265 The campaign was meant to shine a light on the American dependence on imports of
goods and begin to boost domestic manufacturing, becoming a regular part of ABC’s evening
news since its launch. The idea was one shared by President Trump as a similar initiative was
one of the first things on his agenda after his inauguration. In July 2017, the Trump
administration held “Made in America Week”, in which goods produced from all 50 states were
displayed publicly on the White House lawn with vendors present as well.266 This was followed
up by an economic roundtable, whereby the President (and some members of Congress) held a
roundtable discussion with representatives of 20 companies who manufacture their goods in the
United States.267 The initiative was meant to spark interest in the public ahead of the
administration’s intent to enact tax cuts, which would simplify tax brackets for individuals and
cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% in order to incentivize businesses to return
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production on American soil.268 This move was later passed by Congress and became the first
major law that the Trump administration was able to push through.269
These initiatives become important for both countries for different reasons with the same
conclusion: disruption in trade. With Russia, international backlash over their actions in Ukraine
led to many of their major trade partners shutting Russia out from three of its most important
economic sectors. With the United States, trade with China (perhaps the U.S.’ most important trade
partner) has been affected by a trade war that the Trump administration decided to wage on the
Chinese government. The White House announced that this was in retaliation for Chinese
economic espionage that led to theft of intellectual property, high Chinese tariffs on imports from
the United States, and prohibition of certain American goods that would compete with their own
markets.270
PRESSURING ALLIES TO FORCE RUSSIA’S HAND
Success of a containment policy akin to what George Kennan introduced in the 1940’s is
dependent on a continuation of international pressure on the Russian Federation. Since the
economic sanctions were voted on by the United States and its Western allies, EU member states
have questioned whether or not the European Union should continue to sanction Russia.271 In 1947,
Kennan stated that the U.S. could curb Russian aggression by remaining firm in its stance towards
the Soviet Union, even as the two states were meeting at a series of constantly shifting geographical
and political points.”272 This holds true today: if the U.S. and its allies remain patient, while
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standing firm on their positions, it will outlast aggressive Russian foreign policy that seeks to
expand Russian influence in states formerly loyal to Moscow. The sanctions have already forced
Russia to change its economic strategy as it has been denied access to its most important markets.
The drawback is that this has only strengthened the relationship between Russia and China: the
other main rival to the United States on the international stage.
THE SWIFT SYSTEM AND CUTTING RUSSIA OUT
One policy recommendation that has been mentioned before has been the possible
exclusion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system. In 2014, Bloomberg News reported that the
United Kingdom was pressuring the EU to ban Russian banks from the SWIFT system.273 To be
clear, SWIFT stands for the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications and
is an international banking cooperative with (at the time) 10,500 member banks in over 200
countries processing trillions of dollars in transactions daily.274 The UK was pressuring the EU to
bar Russia from SWIFT, just as they had barred Iran from the system in 2012. With the fear of
being banned from the system blatantly obvious, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned that
if Russia was indeed banned, “our economic reaction as with any other reaction will be
unlimited.”275
In the end, the EU decided not to kick Russia from the system. This is most likely due to
the large volume of financial traffic between certain EU member states and Russian banks. Yet it
is also likely due to fear of Russian backlash. While the sanctions prohibit certain transactions,
removal of Russia’s access to the system would effectively destroy their access to these
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international bank transfers and transactions in their largest market. This threat is what led Russia
to create its own international system and invite banks from China, India, Turkey, and Iran to join
and circumvent the threat of Western sanctions and exclusion from certain markets. 276 However,
this action seems to indicate that Matlack was correct in her article when she labeled the removal
from the system a “nuclear option” as the Russian Federation was quick to warn of damaging
retaliation and developed a reciprocal network, inviting partners in eastern markets as insurance
in the event that Russia was to be barred from using SWIFT.277
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CHAPTER 11: CRITICISMS OF THE COLD WAR VIEW
There are still many who remain critical of the current situation being labeled “New Cold
War”. This has to do with the power imbalance between the United States and the Russian
Federation. During the Twentieth Century, the United States and the Soviet Union were the two
global superpowers vying for supremacy. That ended with the complete defeat and breakup of
the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation was one of 15 states to emerge from the Soviet Union
and has simply not reached the level of power that its successor had. Rather than a bipolar
contest between two global super powers, Harvard University’s Arne Westad believes that,
“What we are seeing today is much more reminiscent of Europe in the 19th century—different
powers conflicting over power, influence, and resources in ever-changing constellations.”278
However, Westad also defines a Cold War as “a particular type of conflict that is highly
ideological, long-lasting, bi-polar, and absolute.”279 Yet this is not the definition of a Cold War
that this thesis has been working with. In the introduction section, the term Cold War was
defined as “a condition of rivalry, mistrust, and often open hostility short of violence especially
between power groups (such as labor and management).”280 An example of the latter would be
the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East, as they contend for influence and
power within the region.
Critics also point to the lack of an ideological conflict.281 This is a favorite counter
argument of historians as the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was the
ideological contest between Capitalism and Communism. Michael E. O’Hanlon and Sean Zeigler
278
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bring this argument up again in an article for Brookings where they remind the audience that the
Soviet Union was intent on fulfilling Karl Marx’s vision of a global socialist revolution, while
Putin’s Russia is not.282 In fact, President Putin also admitted the fact that he felt it was impossible
to restore Soviet socialism to Russia as, “there can be social elements in the economy and the
social sector, but expenses will always exceed profits, and as a result, the economy would be at a
dead end.”283 However, this counter argument has already been addressed within the body of this
thesis when discussing today’s ideological conflict as one between open systems (liberal
democracies) versus closed systems (authoritarian states), as President Putin and Russia act as a
Realist power and wage war on the Liberal Democratic Order and international institutions.
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CONCLUSION
In the Twentieth Century, the Cold War was a contest between two global superpowers:
the United States and the Soviet Union. Decades later, the Soviet successor state, the Russian
Federation, and the United States seem to have picked up where that conflict ended and entered a
new conflict. Having offered a working definition of the term Cold War to be a condition of
rivalry and mistrust or hostility stopping short of violence, this thesis has sought to answer the
question on whether or not the United States and the Russian Federation are indeed engaged in a
new Cold War.
Diplomatically, arguments have been made that diplomatic relations between the Russian
Federation and the West (the United States and its allies) are worse than the period in the
Twentieth Century. This is due to Western backlash over the Russian annexation of Ukrainian
territory and sponsorship of war in the country. The backlash, in the form of economic sanctions,
have resulted in Russia’s expulsion from the G-8 summit, a freezing in dialogue between Russia
and the EU, as well as a strengthening of Russia’s relations with other states at odds with the
West.
Informationally, Russia has been using its intelligence services to wage political warfare
against targets in the West to undermine confidence in the stability of democratic governments.
This has come in the form of propaganda and influence campaigns coupled with cyber
operations. The most famous example in recent years has been the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Election but has included almost every country within the European Union. As a top tier cyber
actor, Russia has also demonstrated the ability to cause physical damage through cyber means
and threaten physical infrastructure but has so far only sought to use its abilities for harassment
and influence rather than targeted destruction of Western targets.
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Militarily, Russia has sought to build and modernize its military to compete with and
deter threats from NATO. This has led to increased force sizes from both Russia and NATO
member states in the Western Russian and Eastern European region. This has also led to near
miss events between aerial and naval assets between the opposing sides. This aspect has also
witnessed confrontations between the American and Russian militaries in various parts of the
world via proxy wars in Ukraine, Syria, and the possibility of another (should tensions escalate
to civil war) in Venezuela.
Economically, the sanctions imposed by the United States and its Western allies have
been greatly detrimental to the Russian economy. By targeting the defense, energy, and financial
sectors, the sanctions, coupled with oil prices, sent the Russian economy into recession from
2014 to 2017. The oil prices were a result of the United States and Saudi Arabia weaponizing oil
in 2014 to target both Russia and Iran. The recession, again as a result of sanctions and oil prices,
led to Russia encouraging further domestic output of goods and a reciprocal move from the
United States. Yet this also encouraged Russia to increase trade with the states diplomatically at
odds with the West, such as Iran, North Korea, and China, two of which also happen to border
Russia.
Through use of a comprehensive DIME literature review and analysis, the argument has
been made that the state of geopolitical tension between the two powers is a new Cold War. This
is because the rivalry aspect between Russia and the United States has become apparent,
particularly in Europe (where the United States is dominating) but also in Latin America and
Africa where Russia is increasing its presence. Both vehemently mistrust each other as they
continue to accuse the other of everything from breaking international law to being in violation
of international treaties. Finally, both states seem to attack each other in all dimensions but the
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military dimension as physical violence would only conclude with total obliteration and a
nuclear holocaust.
Today, unlike in the Twentieth Century, the development of, and weaponization of,
computer programs have become one of the defining factors of this new conflict. Both the United
States and the Russian Federation have demonstrated the ability to inflict physical damage using
these digital weapons. Both have also demonstrated the evolution of using cyber means to attack
infrastructure of adversarial nations. The far-reaching implications of the state of the cyber
domain are that a majority of key critical national infrastructure are dependent on computer
networks, there is no current agreement on cyber conduct, and that cyber-attacks are conducted
daily. One question that may arise is how long will this situation continue and/or will tensions
ever be de-escalated? While Khan seemed interested in answering this question during the Cold
War, the understanding of mutual destruction persuaded actors to back down. Conventional
wisdom would believe that, eventually, tensions will de-escalate, as they did in the Twentieth
Century. However, as long as Putin’s regime (or even like minded regimes) are in power in
Russia, and asymmetrical tools like cyber are available, warfare, in one form or another, will
continue between these states that stops short of open kinetic strikes.
For decisionmakers, there would be two major recommendations. The first would be to
revisit George Kennan’s strategy of containment. Kennan stressed strategically meeting the
Soviets at global points of contention and being prepared to force the Soviets to backdown. In
the contemporary era, Turkey did this to the Russian Federation with the shooting down of a
Russian fighter jet in Turkish air space while U.S. Special Forces successfully contacted Russian
led forces in Syria. Both resulted in Russia backing down as Russia stopped violating Turkish air
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space and has since stopped its “near misses” of American military equipment in the Black and
Baltic Seas.
The second major recommendation would be to establish a cyber strategy focused on
Russia. For the same aforementioned reason, major event forcing the Russians to backdown,
there has been no definitive action to cause the Russians to halt a cyber campaign against the
United States. The primary focus of the United States, regarding cyber, is protecting Key Critical
National Infrastructure. With every aspect of KCNI being interconnected in cyber space, and
Russia showing an equivalent cyber capability to the United States, this KCNI is vulnerable.
Couple this with the Obama administration’s move to exile Russian diplomats in response to the
2016 U.S. Presidential Election, and you get a situation where the Russians really have no reason
to stop the attacks. Allowing U.S. cyber assets to conduct a strategic retaliatory strike within the
Russian energy sector, being one of the main Russian economic sectors and being sanctioned,
would send a message that this cyber campaign against the United States would no longer be
tolerated. This may come in the form of ransomware against Rosneft (which acts as an extension
of the Russian state) to hold the company’s computer networks hostage and deny access to
internal servers, or this may come in a targeted strike in which several of their oil refineries are
attacked and computer systems are shutdown. Whatever type of cyber strike is chosen,
something of extreme value to the Russians must be chosen in a manner that will not end in
physical casualties but takes a significant economic and symbolic toll.
Before ending this thesis, the limitations of the research should also be declared. First and
foremost, this work relies exclusively on open source data, meaning that relies on the declared
statements and observed actions of the governments in question. Secondly, the research was
limited to data in English. The data from the Russian sources was accessed through their English
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language results. Finally, the theoretical models that the project relied on may possibly be seen
as dated. The Escalation Ladder, for instance, dates back to 1965 while the DIME model has
been argued (in the past) to be expanded upon to include different instruments of national power.
While conducting research in the future, it may become necessary to re-visit the Escalation
Ladder to see where cyber fits, possibly coming up with a supplemental model to accompany the
Escalation Ladder to indicate where cyber fits in a certain subgroup when comparing it to the
traditional model.
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